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ABSTRACT 
As a society dependent upon our highways, protecting them from the destructive tactics 
of terrorists is critical.  If successfully attacked and destroyed, these critical highway 
infrastructures could isolate a community, severely hamper the transportation of vital 
goods and services, and potentially kill motorists along the structure when the attack 
occurs.  An explosive device detonated in heavy traffic during rush hour could cause 
deaths, significant injuries, and create a psychological impact reverberating around the 
entire country.   
Our open roadway system not only provides us with the freedoms our forefathers 
intended, but also provides terrorists the ability to travel the highways of this country 
without government intervention.  Unfortunately, this unencumbered freedom of 
movement also lends itself to exploitation by terrorists.  Threat assessments consistently 
reveal the vulnerability of our highways and their critical infrastructure to terrorist 
attacks.  Yet, the highways remain underprotected. 
Law enforcement officers are the foot soldiers of the war on terror in the United 
States.  It is a very small army with tremendous responsibility.  Our public looks to the 
police to protect them against crime and criminals; terrorists are the new criminals and 
terrorism is the new crime.  The strategies and tactics to make the public safe against 
terrorism on our highways are similar, and they are a natural extension of existing law 
enforcement highway safety strategies.  No paradigm shift is necessary. 
This thesis proposes strategies designed to take law enforcement’s concept of 
highway safety and expand this paradigm to mesh with the threat environment of 
modern-day terrorism. 
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A. THE PROBLEM: THE HOMELAND SECURITY VOID ON OUR 
HIGHWAYS 
After attacking the United States Naval Fleet in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on 
December 7, 1941, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, Commander in Chief of the Imperial 
Japanese Navy reportedly stated, “I fear all we have done is awaken a sleeping giant and 
fill him with a terrible resolve.”    In many ways, Admiral Yamamoto’s statement 
describes America’s resolve—after nineteen men acting on the behalf of a little-known 
Islamic extremist organization named al Qaeda left us feeling naked and defenseless in 
the days following September 11, 2001.   In essence, the events of that fateful day would 
forever change our way of life.  It was as if we, the United States—the seemingly 
invincible giant—were suddenly awakened to consider the unimaginable: Our nation is 
vulnerable to attacks from small, minimally funded groups using methods and targets we 
previously lacked the imagination to conceive.   
In the days and weeks that followed, our government began to see the obvious: 
weaknesses throughout our nation, including unguarded critical infrastructure and bomb 
materials readily available.   Al Qaeda taught us a hard-learned and immensely costly 
lesson; as a nation, we needed shoring up against this threat of terrorism on American 
soil.  President Bush appointed Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge to head and create 
what evolved into the Department of Homeland Security, with Mr. Ridge named the 
inaugural Secretary of Homeland Security. In his book, The Test of Our Times, former 
Secretary Ridge recalls the first days after the attack, when the government began to 
internalize the sheer volume of vulnerabilities across the country.  Ridge stated, “As for 
the infrastructure itself, the possibilities were endless” (Ridge, 2009, p. 67).    According 
to Ridge, the media enumerated the potential targets, to include bridges, power plants, 
natural pipelines, coastlines, skyscrapers, the water supply, etc.  Our exposures were 
many and the potential was suddenly imaginable.  Thus, the nation began the process of 
making the United States safe again. 
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The newfound threat exposed that we had no roadmap to follow in our quest to 
feel secure in our own country.  From the smoldering embers of 9/11 emerged the 2002 
National Strategy for Homeland Security, the first document to envision a plan for 
renewed security conceived specifically to address our sudden awareness of the 
asymmetric threat posed by our new aggressor, al Qaeda.  The Strategy reflects the 
concerns of our federal government with regard to attacks on critical infrastructure.  It 
states,  
Our critical infrastructures are particularly important because of the 
functions or services they provide to our country.  Our critical 
infrastructures are also particularly important because they are complex 
systems: the effects of a terrorist attack can spread far beyond the direct 
target and reverberate long after the immediate damage. (Office of 
Homeland Security, 2002, p. 30)   
The Strategy recognizes transportation assets as critical infrastructure, acknowledging 
highway structures as part of this declaration.  
On the heels of the 2002 National Strategy emerged Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 7, establishing a national policy for federal agencies to identify 
and prioritize critical resources and key infrastructure, and to protect them from a terrorist 
attack.  The Directive refers to the U.S. Patriot Act for the definition of critical 
infrastructure,  
systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United 
States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would 
have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, 
national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.   
Through the Strategy and HSPD 7, our federal government has acknowledged the 
highway system as a potential terrorism target.  Additionally, both the Strategy and 
HSPD 7 illustrate an understanding of America’s reliance on the roadways and the 
impact an attack would have upon our nation (DHS, 2003). 
In response to revelations regarding the vulnerability to the highway system and 
its critical infrastructure, the Federal Highway Administration commissioned a blue 
ribbon panel of experts convened to explore the vulnerabilities with specific emphasis on 
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bridge and tunnel security.  The study claims that, of the 600,000 bridges in the United 
States, approximately 1,000, if attacked, would result in substantial casualties and 
significant economic disruption.  Three hundred thirty seven highway tunnels are located 
beneath bodies of water and, if disabled, the community would be left with limited 
alternative routes because of the geographical constraints of the area.  Because of the 
elevated risk of these bridges and tunnels, the blue ribbon panel recommended they be 
given priority in vulnerability reduction (Federal Highway Administration, 2003, p. 8). 
The United States Department of Homeland Security’s Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) was created in the wake of 9/11, has the lead role in transportation 
security, and is responsible for providing threat assessments for the nation’s 
transportation infrastructure.   With respect to the threats on our highways, TSA’s 
assessment indicates the most likely culprit in an attack on the highway system will be al 
Qaeda.  This conclusion was drawn after TSA conducted an historical analysis of prior 
terrorist plots, attempts and successes. The report states, “Militants associated with al 
Qaeda have been linked to actual and suspected terrorist plots aimed at tunnels and 
bridges inside the United States and abroad” (TSA, 2006, p 2).   TSA also considers an 
attack on the highway system by many potential threats: insiders (disgruntled 
employees), lone wolves, right-wing and left-wing extremists, and religious extremists.  
Al Qaeda has emerged as the most likely threat because of past interest they have 
displayed towards critical highway infrastructure. 
According to the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (2008), 255,917,664 vehicles 
are registered in the United States, with 9,779 annual vehicles miles traveled per capita.  
People living in the United States are far more dependent upon the highways than 
populations in most developed nations.  The lack of a robust rail system means, as a 
nation, we are dependent upon our highways as a primary method of travel and 
commerce.  Outside of the death toll and replacement of the infrastructure, a significant 
interruption on the highway system has huge economic implications.  For example, 
according to the Minnesota Department of Transportation (2009), the collapse of the 
Interstate 35 Bridge in Minneapolis, Minnesota, on August 1, 2007, resulted in a net loss 
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of $400,000 per day to the local economy.  When the new bridge was finally opened, on 
September 18, 2008, the loss to Minnesota’s economy had reached $60 million.    
As a society dependent upon our highways, protecting them from the destructive 
tactics of terrorists is critical.  If successfully attacked and destroyed, these critical 
highway infrastructures could isolate a community, severely hamper the transportation of 
vital goods and services, and potentially kill motorists along the structure when the attack 
occurs.  An explosive device detonated in heavy traffic during rush hour could cause 
deaths, significant injuries and create a psychological impact reverberating around the 
entire country.  Additionally, terrorists who choose to use explosives must transport them 
from the point of manufacture to the target destination.  Transportation of these volatile 
substances will likely occur on the roadway, creating the potential for premature 
detonation, being involved in an accident along the route, or having mechanical difficulty 
and becoming disabled en route.   
The vastness of our nation, coupled with the insufficient railway network, places 
many dangerous products on our roadways as they are often distributed by large trucks.  
Therefore, legitimate truckloads of highly flammable fuel or other hazardous chemicals 
could be hijacked and suddenly become ready-made explosives or chemical weapon 
attack vessels—much like the hijacked planes became improvised explosive devices.   An 
analysis conducted by Jenkins, Butterworth, Poe, Reeves, Shrum and Trella of the Mineta 
Transportation Institute entitled Potential Terrorist Uses of Highway Borne Hazardous 
Materials (2010), concludes al Qaeda in particular has remained committed to utilizing 
vehicle-born improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) due to the potential body count and 
massive damage inflicted by such a device.   The researchers note that terrorists prefer 
truckloads of stolen or fabricated explosives, but add that trucks carrying flammable 
liquids, gases or toxic inhalants can be ready-made weapons.  Jenkins et al. state that the 
appeal of hazardous material-laden trucks is because they are ubiquitous and less guarded 
(pp. 1–2). 
The ability to use these devices has been less problematic for al Qaeda in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, where it has access to the materials needed to create an explosive.  
However, in the United States, acquisition of explosives is more difficult because of 
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increased security and monitoring.  The theft of a vehicle loaded with flammable liquids, 
solids or gases fills this void.  Additionally, the release of hazardous chemicals, such as 
toxic inhalants in a congested area, could create the effect sought by a terrorist 
organization.  Thefts of these vehicles and their hazardous cargo are not uncommon. 
On June 2, 2004, two propane tankers filled with a total of 5,500 gallons of 
propane were stolen from a gas distribution company in San Antonio, Texas.  The San 
Antonio Police immediately contacted the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the 
Department of Homeland Security.  In the subsequent news release, an FBI agent stated 
that terrorists are trained to use propane, and that the agency was very concerned about 
the theft (LaMartina, 2004). 
On February 8, 2008, two tanker trucks loaded with diesel fuel were stolen from a 
construction site in Prince William County, Virginia.  The trucks carried a total of 3,000 
gallons of diesel fuel.  The local police contacted the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
because of the potential nexus to terrorism.  Both trucks were located several days later 
(www.wtop.com).  
On April 30, 2009, a truck was stolen from a landscape company in Tuscumbia, 
Alabama.  The thieves loaded the truck with 1,000 pounds of high-grade nitrate fertilizer 
before leaving the business.  The news report noted the theft was alarming because the 
fertilizer can be used to build a bomb.  Although the truck was later discovered, the 
fertilizer was not recovered (Stephens, 2009). 
Our open roadway system not only provides us with the freedoms our forefathers 
intended, but also provides terrorists the ability to travel the highways of this country 
without government intervention.  Unfortunately, this unencumbered freedom of 
movement also lends itself to exploitation by terrorists.   
Despite the threat assessments and the devastating consequences of an attack on 
our highway infrastructure, much of the emphasis in transportation security in the United 
States is on airport security.  This overarching interest in aviation security has its 
foundations in the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, which exposed gaping 
vulnerabilities at our airports.  This gap in homeland security attention on our highways 
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illustrates the lack of imagination and inability to understand the gravity of the threat as 
the 9/11 Commissioners detailed in The 9/11 Commission Report.  Roadside bombs and 
attacks on critical highway infrastructure in the United States are currently conceptual.  
Because such attacks have either not occurred or have had only minimal impact, much 
less emphasis has been placed in addressing these vulnerabilities, despite assessments to 
support the risk. This is further evidenced by the 2011 fiscal year Transportation Security 
Administration budget, in which over $5.5 billion was allocated for aviation security; 
only $137,558,000 was allocated for surface transportation security (DHS, 2010, p. 72).  
In its definition of surface transportation, the Department of Homeland Security includes 
buses, mass transit, hazardous material transportation, railroads, and 3.8 million miles of 
roadways that include 582,000 bridges that span more than 20 feet, and 54 tunnels over 
19,685 feet in length  (DHS, 2010, p. 70). 
In terms of potential tactics used on our highways or on highway infrastructure, 
the roadside bomb, also known as an IED, is a prominent terrorism tool across the globe.  
The use of such a tactic has been minimal in the United States; however, this method is 
expected to gain prominence.  According to Cordesman and Lemieux (2010), the United 
States military is reporting an upsurge in roadside bombs in Afghanistan as the Taliban 
insurgency has increased their use of this tactic.  The Pentagon’s Joint Improvised 
Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) reported over 1,100 IED attacks in 
May 2010, more than doubling the quantity reported just one year earlier. 
Lieutenant General Michael Oates, director of the JIEDDO, in a statement at the 
Foreign Press Center said, “We track about three to four hundred incidents a month 
occurring outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, where people are using improvised explosive 
devices against law enforcement or against military security forces” (Mora, 2010).  
The Homeland Security Newswire reports intelligence community concerns that 
Mexican drug cartels will escalate the use of car bombs as weapons in the ongoing drug 
wars.    The report cites several IED incidents in Mexico.  On July 15 2010, the Juarez 
cartel killed four law enforcement agents and injured nine other first responders after the 
cartel remotely detonated an IED inside a car in Juarez.  The cartel had lured the agents to 
the vehicle by reporting it contained a dead body.  In the wake of this IED attack, other 
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cartels followed suit.  The Gulf cartel launched six IED attacks from August to December 
2010.  On January 22, 2011, an IED was detonated in a car in Tula, Hidalgo.  Once again, 
the police officers responded to a tip that the vehicle had a body inside it. When agents 
opened the car door, the bomb exploded, injuring four officers. 
The sudden upsurge of IEDs in Mexico, according to the Homeland Security 
Newswire article, is because,  
In Mexico IEDs are easy to construct thanks to easy access to powerful 
commercial explosives that are widely used in the country’s mining and 
petroleum industry.  Due to strict gun laws, it is actually cheaper and 
easier to obtain explosives than guns. (HSNW, April 28, 2011)  
This article illustrates an important point about a potential emerging threat—far 
outside the scope of what we have experienced in terms of traditional terrorism—by 
adding the use of IEDs by Mexican drug cartels into the threat matrix.  Although the use 
of IEDs by Mexican drug cartels has thus far been confined to Mexico and appears to be 
directed at law enforcement, this tactic could cross the border into the United States and 
potentially target police in the United States who frequently disrupt shipments of illegal 
drugs transported out of Mexico. 
On a domestic level, recognizing the improvised explosive device (IED) threat in 
the United States has only recently come to the forefront.  For example, the Department 
of Homeland Security issued the first presidential directive dedicated to IEDs as recently 
as 2007.  Homeland Security Presidential Directive 19 (HSPD-19) entitled Combating 
Terrorist Use of Explosives in the United States, notes,  
Terrorists have repeatedly shown their willingness and ability to use 
explosives as weapons worldwide, and there is ample intelligence to 
support the conclusion that they will continue to use such devices to inflict 
harm. The threat of explosive attacks in the United States is of great 
concern considering terrorists’ ability to make, obtain, and use explosives, 
the ready availability of components used in IED construction, the relative 
technological ease with which an IED can be fashioned, and the nature of 
our free society. 
The National Intelligence Estimate (2007) indicated the U.S. homeland will 
continue to see persistent and evolving terror threats to include Islamic terrorist groups, 
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especially al Qaeda, who remains undiminished and continues to adapt and improve their 
capabilities.  The report concluded that al Qaeda is proficient with improvised explosives 
and will target infrastructure, and prominent political and economic targets within the 
United States.  
In his testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on February 
16, 2011, Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper stated,  
Participants in the global jihad have relied on improvised and scavenged 
military explosives as well as other improvised and conventional weapons.  
The reliability and availability of these materials make it likely that they 
will remain a major part of the terrorist’s inventory. (Office of the Director 
of National Intelligence, 2011, p. 3) 
IEDs are an effective weapon because of their ability to induce widespread fear 
and intimidation. With regard to the use of such a tactic on the highways within the 
United States, the Department of Homeland Security’s Terror Threat to U.S. Highway 
System (2006) states, “Because powerful and effective IEDs can be easily made from 
readily available components, these devices pose the primary threat to the U.S. highway 
system.”   The report provides ample illustrations of the IED threat to highways and 
critical highway infrastructure.  In 1993, the Federal Bureau of Investigation uncovered 
the “Day of Terror” plot in which militants were planning to use improvised explosives to 
blow up the Lincoln Tunnel, the Holland Tunnel and the George Washington Bridge.  In 
2005, an arrest of an al Qaeda network consisting of 41 people in Spain revealed 
evidence of terrorist interest in U.S. bridges, to include the Brooklyn Bridge and the 
Golden Gate Bridge (DHS, 2006).  More recently, Faisal Shahzad attempted to detonate 
an IED secreted in a vehicle parked along a crowded street in New York City’s Times 
Square on May 1, 2010.   
IED construction instructions are easily attainable, as illustrated in the winter 
2010 edition of al Qaeda’s Inspire Magazine (2010), which contained directions on how 
to make a simple IED.  The simplicity of design, in conjunction with the profound 
physical and psychological effects, are its appeal to terrorist seeking to make a big impact 
with little funding.   
 9 
Law enforcement plays a vital role in securing our highways from both terror and 
criminal threats.  A report produced by United States General Accounting Office entitled 
Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address Security Challenges 
(2003) states, 
As we have previously reported, state and local governments are critical 
stakeholders in    the nation’s homeland security efforts.  This is equally 
true in securing the nation’s transportation system.  State and local 
governments play a critical role, in part, because they own a significant 
portion of the transportation infrastructure, such as airports, transit 
systems, highways and ports.  For example, state and local governments 
own over 90 percent of total mileage of the highway system.  Even when 
the state and local governments are not the local owner operators, they 
nonetheless are directly affected by the transportation modes that run 
through their jurisdictions.  Consequently, the responsibility for protecting 
this infrastructure and responding to emergencies involving the 
transportation infrastructure often falls to state and local governments. 
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 forever changed our nation.  Law enforcement 
practitioners were suddenly thrust into a new role well outside the general confines of 
crime.   Morreale and Lambert (2009) argue that state, local, and tribal police are now on 
the forefront of homeland security, where traditional counterterrorism organizations are 
no longer effective.  The researchers contend police agencies are under-trained, under-
funded, understaffed, and under-equipped to deal with the new realities of homeland 
security. 
According to Moghaddam (2008), globalization will continue to spur terrorism: 
 The global shifts we are experiencing, and particularly the decline of 
traditional moral orders, are giving rise to counter movements and 
reactions, some of them radical and even violent.  Terrorism is just one 
example of these counter movements, as violent extremists react to 
enormous changes they sense, changes that seriously threaten the 
continuation of lifestyles they support. (p. 1)    
Our military personnel, who are actively engaged abroad in the fight against 
terrorism, have witnessed significant increases in IEDs in the form of roadside bombs use 
by insurgents in Afghanistan against U.S. military and civilian targets.  Our national 
leaders agree that al Qaeda and like-minded extremist groups remain committed to 
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attacking the United States, and will likely utilize IEDs as a means of attack.  Threat 
assessments indicate our highways are critical infrastructures, have been the target of 
unsuccessful attacks in the past, and will continue to be vulnerable to terrorist attacks.  
IEDs, whether destined for highway critical infrastructure or another target, must be 
transported to the intended target; our roadways will be utilized for transporting IEDs.  
The federal government indicates the responsibility for securing our transportation 
systems lies in the hands of state and local governments who own the highways.  The 
effects of globalization will continue to threaten group identities.  The collision of 
cultures and struggle to maintain cultural identity will inevitably lead to clashes between 
societies in the form of terrorism.  Terrorism has endured the test of time and will 
continue to do so. 
As a nation, we are ill prepared for terrorism on our highways.  Law enforcement 
organizations are uniquely situated among public safety organizations within the 
homeland security enterprise with regard to terrorism.  Terrorism, in its most basic form, 
is a crime.  Law enforcement agencies are the sole organization within the homeland 
security enterprise charged with investigating crimes and making arrests.  Terrorism 
prevention is a natural extension of crime prevention, and rests squarely upon the 
shoulders of our men and women in law enforcement.   
This is especially true of our street officers, who are often the most visible law 
enforcement element on our roadways as they go about their daily duties enforcing traffic 
laws.  These police officers in particular are in prime positions in our fight against 
terrorism on the roadways.  Many are oblivious of their changing role regarding this 
constantly evolving threat.  Despite the fact that our police are the front line of defense, 
some police agencies have not come to terms with their new role in the homeland 
security enterprise.  Failing to realize that their role has evolved to include terrorism has 
left many police agencies unprepared strategically, psychologically and physically to 
respond to an attack on our highways or elsewhere.   
This does not have to be the case.  Law enforcement agencies are public safety 
centric, generally accomplished through education and enforcement of the law.  Highway 
safety is a natural extension of this public safety mission; however, law enforcement 
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agencies must adopt strategies to fit this new, uniquely law enforcement mission.  Jose 
Docobo noted this in his article published in Homeland Security Affairs (2005), 
Traditionally, local law enforcement has concerned itself primarily with 
preventing and solving crimes such as burglary, theft, and robbery—
crimes that have an immediate and visible impact on the local community 
and affect citizen quality of life. In the face of unknown future terrorist 
threats, however, local law enforcement organizations will have to adapt 
existing policing strategies to fulfill the requirement of homeland security.    
The problem this research investigates is how to take law enforcement’s concept 
of highway safety and expand this paradigm to mesh with the threat environment that 
modern-day terrorism has thrust upon us.  The goal is to emerge with a restructured law 
enforcement paradigm reflecting a shift away from a myopic focus of traditional highway 
safety and resulting in more dynamic, adaptive highway security strategies. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman cautions us to avoid impatience and the 
temptation to declare war on terrorism, stating, “Winning the war on terrorism will take 
decades, not years to accomplish.  If we are to succeed, our efforts must be as tireless, 
innovative and dynamic as those of our opponents” (Hoffman, 2006, p. 295).  Hoffman’s 
statement illustrates that the threat of terrorism is an enduring theme and will remain in 
our nation’s foreseeable future. 
Law enforcement officers are the infantrymen against crime and, in today’s 
environment, this includes the crime of terrorism.   Hoffman observes, “More and more, 
the measure of success in the war on terrorism is defined as the ability of intelligence 
agencies and law enforcement organizations to prevent, preempt, and deter acts” 
(Hoffman, 2006, p. 295). 
Despite the enduring nature of terrorism and the expectations placed on law 
enforcement agencies to address the threat, there are no universal models for securing our 
highways.  The overarching goal of this research is to resolve this dilemma through 
addressing the central question of what strategies law enforcement agencies can 
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implement to protect the roadways and the public by preventing a terrorist attack on this 
open, extremely critical infrastructure—our highways. 
Pelfrey, a University of Wisconsin researcher (2007), analyzed data collected 
pursuant to the South Carolina Law Enforcement Census.  Pelfrey’s analysis reveals less 
than half of all agencies responding to the survey had developed a policy toward handling 
terrorism threats or events, with only a minority of agencies having conducted any type 
of terrorism prevention training or response exercises. Pelfrey concluded that terrorism 
preparedness among police agencies was a product of agency size, having a SWAT team, 
orientation toward technology, and accreditation status.  Although confined to one state, 
Pelfrey’s research illustrates how many law enforcement organizations have failed to 
recognize this new and unique niche that only law enforcement can fill in the homeland 
security enterprise.    
The face of law enforcement is often the highway cop, enforcing speeding laws 
and licensing violations.  Highway safety is a basic element of law enforcement services, 
and is often a gateway to solving much more heinous crimes.  For example, Timothy 
McVeigh, Ted Bundy and David Berkowitz are some of the few high-profile criminals 
apprehended by police officers during routine traffic enforcement situations.  Traffic 
police officers are in prime position to intercept a terrorist en route to his or her target 
destination.  Before law enforcement can engage in this new role, they must first 
understand and then embrace it. 
• How can we get police officers to accept their role in the homeland 
security enterprise? 
• How can law enforcement become more engaged in the prevention of 
terrorism on our highways? 
• Law enforcement is not alone in this quest to secure our highways against 
terrorism.  What other agencies can law enforcement employ in their 
efforts to prevent terrorism on our highways?   
• What is law enforcement’s role in educating the public with regard to 
terrorism prevention? 
• Is a multi-discipline approach possible? 
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According to the 2010 census, the population of the United States is 308,745,538 
(U.S. Census Bureau).   If left to the police, with just over 880,000 law enforcement 
officers in the United States, preventing terrorism would be impossible (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, 2010).  Preventing terrorism on our highways cannot be accomplished without 
engaging the public in the prevention process.  We need the strength of our population 
and the help of the public to keep our highways safe.  However, capitalizing on the 
strength of the masses, especially in the United States, remains an elusive goal as 
terrorism on our home turf is a faint memory and prevention is pushed aside by the issue 
du jour.    
• How can law enforcement better harness the power of the public in the 
role of preventing terrorism on the highways?   
• Can social media be of benefit to preventing terrorism on our roadways? 
IEDs are not a new tactic.  Their prominence in Afghanistan and Iraq, the ease in 
which they are made, and their profound physical and psychological effects makes them 
the weapon of choice for al Qaeda and other extremist groups.  Other nations have 
extensive experience dealing with IEDs, such as the United Kingdom whose “troubles” 
with the Provisional Irish Republic Army (PIRA) was fraught with IED attacks from the 
1970s through 1998.  However, the United States has by contrast has little experience in 
this arena.  The experience of others is worthy of exploration to determine whether 
prevention strategies employed elsewhere in the world would be applicable in the United 
States.  
• What strategies have been employed by other nations with experience in 
terrorists’ use of IEDs on roadways and highway infrastructure? 
• Can these strategies be employed to prevent IED attacks on roadways in 
the United States? 
There is a substantial void between the vulnerabilities on our roadways, and the 
critical highway infrastructure, and the pervasive threat posed by al Qaeda, like-minded 
terrorists, and the future of terrorism on American soil in the wake of expanding 
globalism.  As law enforcement managers and homeland security leaders, we can no 
longer ignore this threat; to do so would put us in the September 10, 2001, mindset.   
Billions of dollars have been spent to ensure we do not repeat history.  Despite all the 
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money spent on protecting our homeland, our roadways are not secure. As homeland 
security leaders, the public is looking to us to fill this void.   
C. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
Our national experts on homeland security agree our nation is still vulnerable to 
terrorist attacks.  Al Qaeda in particular has determination and resolve in their quest for 
destruction of the ideals of the United States, which stand in dire opposition to extremist 
Islam. Our highways contain critical infrastructure in the form of bridges and tunnels that 
would isolate communities if destroyed.  Al Qaeda in particular has shown interest in 
destroying these structures as learned through foiled plots.  IEDs are the methodology of 
choice for al Qaeda and like-minded extremist.  Roadside bombs attacks are increasing in 
Afghanistan, with the likelihood of this tactic emerging in the United States, our 
roadways are vulnerable. 
Chapter I illustrates the vulnerable nature of our roadways to terrorism.  Our 
roadways are a vital critical infrastructure, so deeply interwoven with so many other 
critical infrastructures that a terrorists attack on our roadways, especially an attack that 
destroys a bridge or tunnel, would have cascading effects on the other critical 
infrastructures resulting not only in loss of human life and costly repairs, but also 
profoundly affecting our way of life.   Prior terrorism attempts on our roadways and 
highway critical infrastructure and warnings from our national homeland security leaders 
solidify the threat.  Yet, despite this vulnerability, funding for transportation security 
continues to favor aviation security with only 2.5% of the Transportation Security 
Administration’s budget allocated for surface transportation. Most roadways and highway 
critical infrastructure are owned by local and state governments; therefore, the protection 
of these vital assets is viewed as the responsibility of the state and local governments.   
Chapter I also argues law enforcement agencies are the first line of defense in the 
protection of our highways and highway critical infrastructures.  Police have not yet fully 




position within the homeland security enterprise.  The chapter concludes by asking what 
strategies can be employed in an effort to make our highways more secure against the 
threat of terrorism. 
Chapter II examines the status of highway security strategies.  The literature 
review is a critical analysis of the existing literature on the subject and gives the reader a 
sense of the strategies currently employed as a means of protecting America’s highways 
and highway critical infrastructure while exposing a gap in the literature.  The chapter 
includes an analysis of national highway security strategies, state and local strategies, 
academic views of highway security strategy, and strategies for the IED threat.  The 
critical analysis of these strategies further illustrates the strategic void in our nation’s 
ability to secure the highways from terrorism threats.     
Chapter III provides a case study analysis of several methodologies used for 
engaging the public in the prevention of terrorism.  Though not specific to terrorism on 
our highways, these models offer insight into the best ways to garner the public’s 
assistance. The case studies include the United States Coast Guard’s America’s 
Waterway Watch program, the See Something Say Something program, the First 
Observer program and the United Kingdom’s centralized PREVENT  program. 
Chapter IV provides an analysis of the public engagement models and argues the 
deficiencies in these models reflect the poor strategies upon which the models are based. 
The strategies do not take into account the complex nature of homeland security; 
therefore, any tactics, such as those applied in the public engagement models, mirror the 
lack of complexity and are flawed.    
The literature review reveals the lack of meaningful and actionable strategies 
designed to address the vulnerabilities on our highways, while the case studies reveal that 
despite the need for citizen involvement in protecting our nation against terrorism, many 
of the current citizen involvement programs are deficient.  Chapter V provides an overall 
synthesis of the research by formulating realistic, meaningful and implementable law 
enforcement strategies that incorporate a holistic public involvement element.  The 
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strategies are designed for law enforcement executives to tailor to the individual needs of 
their community with regard to securing the nation’s highways against terrorism. 
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
This research provides local and state law enforcement, as well as local, state and 
federal decision makers, with research-based methods that should be employed to reduce 
the terror threat to our nation’s highways.    Acknowledging law enforcement agencies 
differ vastly in their resources, abilities, the types of communities they serve, populations, 
existing highway critical infrastructure, congestion on highways, and whether they serve 
an urban or rural environment makes the process of creating a singular model impossible.  
This research offers police executives strategies that can be adopted singularly or in 
combination with one another, thus allowing a tailored approach to meeting the highway 
security needs of the community through research-based policy efforts. The research is 
significant to the security of over 308 million people who depend on our roadways—not 
just for travel, but also for the delivery of vital goods and services—the findings of this 
research, if implemented, will make the country safer.  
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II. CURRENT STRATEGIES 
This literature review is devoted to an examination of existing highway security 
strategies.  The literature is subdivided into four areas: national strategy documents, state 
and local highway security strategy, academic views on highway security strategy, and 
strategies to address the IED threat.  The strategies represent the existing roadmap and an 
opportunity to see where we are as well as where we need to go. 
A. NATIONAL HIGHWAY SECURITY STRATEGY 
Executive Order 13416 Strengthening Surface Transportation Security states, 
 The security of our Nation’s surface transportation systems is a national 
priority, vital to our economy, and essential to the security of our Nation. 
Federal, state, local, and tribal governments, the private sector, and the 
public share responsibility for the security of surface transportation.  It is 
the policy of the United States to protect the people, property, and territory 
of the United States by facilitating the implementation of a 
comprehensive, coordinated, and efficient security program to protect 
surface transportation systems within and adjacent to the United States 
against terrorist attacks. (Bush, 2006)   
The executive order places the Secretary of Homeland Security as the principal federal 
official responsible for surface transportation infrastructure protection and designates this 
person to develop a comprehensive transportation systems sector-specific plan.  
The vastness and diversity of the types of critical infrastructure and key resources 
across the United States cannot be protected by a single entity.  Oversight of these 
differing critical infrastructures is therefore divided across many agencies, each one 
adding a level of expertise in their associated field.  The 2009 National Infrastructure 
Protection Plan (NIPP) creates seventeen critical infrastructure/key resource (CIKR) 
sectors, and designates responsibility for each of the seventeen CIKR sectors to at least 
one federal agency. The NIPP sets a risk assessment strategy in the form of a framework 
for organizing critical infrastructure and key resource protection across all levels of 
government.  The strategy entails setting security goals, identifying assets, systems, 
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networks and functions, assessing risks, prioritizing, implementing protective programs 
and measuring effectiveness (p. 40).  According to the NIPP, the feedback loop ensures 
refinement of the strategy (see Figure 1).   
      
 
Figure 1.   NIPP Risk Management Framework  
The National Infrastructure Protection Plan places the Transportation Security 
Administration and the United States Coast Guard (due to Maritime assets) as the 
agencies responsible for transportation systems (DHS, 2009, p. 19). 
The NIPP is an extremely broad strategy document; outside of defining which 
agency is responsible for which CIKR, it offers no specificity to protection of the 
individual sector’s critical infrastructures, such as transportation.  Instead, the NIPP 
directs sector-specific agencies to create sector-specific strategies through a coordinated 
effort involving their public and private sector CIKR partners within the risk assessment 
framework.   
The sector-specific plan, Transportation Systems: Critical Infrastructure and Key 
Resources Sector Specific Plan as Input to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan 
(2007), divides transportation into six sub-sectors (aviation, maritime, mass transit, 
highway infrastructure and motor carrier, freight rail and pipeline).  Despite the 
delineation between the sub-sectors, the transportation-specific infrastructure protection 
plan calls for a systems approach, thus acknowledging cross-sector dependencies 
amongst and between the sub-sectors that if attacked would lead to non-linear 
consequences and cascading failures—a ripple effect.   Additionally, the sector-specific 
plan explains securing the highway’s critical infrastructure is a shared responsibility 
between the federal, state, local governments and the private sector. 
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The Transportation Systems sector’s goals are to prevent and deter acts of 
terrorism against the transportation system, to enhance resilience of the U.S. 
transportation system and to improve the cost effective use of resources for transportation 
security. The NIPP calls for each critical infrastructure/key resource sector to create a 
Government Coordinating Council (GCC) and a Sector Coordinating Council (SCC). The 
GCC and SCC set these goals and ensure the underlying objectives are consistent with 
transportation security strategy. These councils are designed to create a structure through 
which representative groups from all levels of government and the private sector can 
collaborate or share existing approaches to CIKR protection and work together to 
advance capabilities (DHS, 2007, p. 4). 
Because of the existence of sub-sectors within the transportation protection plan, 
each sub-sector has a sub-strategy.  The sub-sector strategy dedicated to highway security 
is Annex D. Highway Infrastructure and Motor Carrier.  Each of the sub-sectors with the 
Transportation Sector plan has separate and distinct GCCs and SCCs.  According to 
Annex D., the objective of the highway GCC is to coordinate strategies, activities, 
establish policies, guidelines, standards, develop program metrics and performance 
criteria for the mode.  Membership on the Highway Infrastructure and Motor Carrier 
GCC consists of federal agencies involved with highway and motor carrier security, with 
the potential to expand membership on the GCC to state and local agencies.  The 
highway GCC is charged with maintaining relationships with other GCC transportation 
modes to ensure connectivity across modes due to the interdependencies and in the 
interest in sustaining the systematic foundations of the overall transportation systems 
sector specific strategy.    
SCCs are self-formed councils of private sector infrastructure owners, operators 
and trade associations.  More specifically, the Highway Infrastructure and Motor Carrier 
SCC is a private sector advisory body, consisting of members of the motor coach, school 
bus, and trucking associations.  The SCC is responsible for intra-sector communications, 
setting processes for information sharing, priority setting on sector strategies, policies and 
procedures, threat communication and analysis, sector protection, response and recovery 
planning, and communication of sector needs to the GCC (pp. A84–A87).   
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The private and public industry leaders who form the GCCs and SCCs evaluate 
risk and set strategic objectives.  Transportation Systems indicates these strategic 
objectives establish specific, measureable, realistic, attainable goals that will improve the 
transportation sectors risk profile. Figure 2 details the Transportation Systems sector’s 
risk management framework incorporated within the NIPP strategic framework.  
 
 
Figure 2.   Risk Management Framework/Transportation Security Systems Based Risk 
Management Process 
The annex that most concerns this research is Annex D, Highway Infrastructure 
and Motor Carrier (Annex D).  Annex D recognizes the uniqueness of this critical 
infrastructure; indicating it supports 86 percent of personal travel, moves 80 percent of 
the nation’s freight and is key to the nation’s defense mobility.  Highway infrastructure is 
interconnected to other critical infrastructures, providing economic vitality, 
telecommunications and supporting public health (p. A84).     
The three goals contained with Transportation Systems are incorporated into each 
of the sub-sector annexes and are conceived within the aforementioned risk management 
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framework.  However, the objectives within each of the three goals are more specific to 
the sub-sector.  In general, federal government-led efforts toward these goals as 
enumerated in Annex D include security awareness training, technology and screening 
programs, while the public sector has created programs that encourage private sector 
security initiatives. The Annex goes on to describe various programs, technologies and 
grant-funded initiatives falling within the three goals of the transportation sector plan. 
Because of the complexity of the national critical infrastructure, the national 
strategy documents are designed like matryoska dolls, each one nesting in another 
smaller framework adding details; alone, however, they are devoid of utility.   Thus, they 
must be analyzed and viewed as a whole.   This is the essential problem with the 
transportation sector’s national critical infrastructure strategy.  It is far too complex to be 
meaningful and applicable. 
The national strategy for protection of highway critical infrastructure uses the 
terms protection, prevention and security interchangeably throughout the documents, as 
to imply the words are synonymous.  However, these words have different meanings and, 
therefore, may require different strategies altogether.  A strategy to protect highways 
from terrorism would be far different from a strategy to prevent terrorism on the 
highways.  This leaves the reader and, more importantly, those expected to apply the 
strategy, confused about the purpose of the strategy.  It appears the national strategy is a 
document designed merely to show the federal government has a strategy and, because 
such strategy exists, the federal government has overcome vicarious liability.  Its utility at 
the grassroots level is absent, leaving the nation without a meaningful and implementable 
strategy for protecting our highways from terrorism.  
According to Annex D, state and local governments own most highways, thus, 
“Protecting the highway transportation system is a shared responsibility between state 
and local transportation agencies and their sister agencies responsible for law 
enforcement” (p. A84).  The Government Accountability Office went further to state, 
“The bulk of the responsibility for implementing specific security measures falls largely 
on state and local governments who own most highway infrastructure” (GAO, 2009, 
p. 2).  The highway Government Coordinating Council (GCC), the body responsible for 
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creating the sub-sector strategy and underlying metrics, ironically does not contain 
members of the state and local transportation agencies or law enforcement officials.  
Although the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials 
(AASHTO) are represented on the council, the association cannot adequately represent 
the diverse transportation security needs of the multitude of transportation agencies 
across our vast nation.  As of March 1, 2011, membership on the GCC was dominated by 
federal agencies (DHS, 2011).  
Our current highway security strategies were conceived by federal agencies 
without critical input of those who own the highway infrastructure and those who are the 
first line of defense in protecting it.  This lack of input from the owners of the highway 
critical infrastructure—state and local governments and the private sector transportation 
agencies, as well as law enforcement agencies—is a tremendous oversight. The fact that 
the NIPP, and especially the Transportation Sector Specific Plan and Annex D, Highway 
and Motor Carrier were created without the input of a critical component—the state and 
local agencies that, according to the federal government who authored the strategy, own 
the highways and are the first line of defense in the event of a crisis, is a deeply flawed 
approach to strategy development.  Buy-in and commitment to the strategy from the state 
and local governments who are expected to implement the strategy is necessary for 
success.   
Annex D requires the GCC and SCC to submit revisions to the strategy once a 
year and rewrite the strategy every three years (p. A103).   The most current 
Transportation Security strategy and sub-sector strategy documents are dated 2007, thus 
these important documents have not been updated as required, indicative of the lack of 
importance and commitment to improving the strategy at the national level.         
The clear implication throughout these strategy documents is recognition of the 
interdependencies of critical infrastructure and how a crisis within a sub-sector can lead 
to cascading failures across many critical infrastructures.  This explains why the federal 
government has a vested interest in critical infrastructure protection and the desire to set 
strategy; critical infrastructure interdependencies dictate the system is too big to fail.   
However, the one-size-fits-all approach, one framework and expecting all the sector-
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specific agencies to tailor their strategies within the framework, does not consider the 
uniqueness of the vast critical infrastructure across our nation.    
Despite the voluminous nature of the transportation and highway national strategy 
documents, the documents fail to assign specific roles and responsibilities.  This 
oversight can lead to much confusion, with no entity having a defined role in the 
protection of highway critical infrastructure.  Without assigned responsibilities with 
regard to the overall strategy and either no one is responsible for implementing the 
strategy or the lack of coordinating responsibility leads to duplication, or lack of 
attentiveness altogether.       
Not only does the strategy lack input from the state and local governments who 
own, maintain, fund and are expected by the community to protect the highways, the 
strategy lacks the critical element of collaboration from those outside of transportation 
but who would be included in prevention and response efforts, such a law enforcement 
officials.  If a broad national strategy is necessary, it must be meaningful and adaptive to 
those expected to implement the strategy.  A strategy for the sake of strategy is 
meaningless and without utility, especially to those expected to implement such a 
strategy.  State and local officials are in need of an implementable utilitarian strategy.   
The national strategy documents with regard to highway protection were conceived and 
are expected to be applied in a vacuum.  Protection is contained solely within those 
organizations that clearly fit within a narrow definition of “transportation stakeholders,” 
ignoring the broader spectrum of entities that play a role in protecting the assets and, 
perhaps more importantly, ignoring local communities who understand the dynamics of 
their roadways and highway critical infrastructure much more intimately than federal 
transportation agencies.  This narrow focus, this inability to address highway security in 
terms of a multidiscipline, community-oriented approach is unrealistic, especially 
considering how these documents clearly acknowledge the interdependencies to other 
critical infrastructures inherent to our highways and the impact on local communities in 
the event of a large-scale critical incident.   
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B. STATE AND LOCAL STRATEGIES 
Individual state critical infrastructure plans follow the federal model, pushing the 
responsibility for transportation critical infrastructure protection strategy to state-level 
department of transportation agencies.  For example, the Commonwealth of Virginia 
Critical Infrastructure Protection and Resiliency Strategic Plan places the Virginia 
Department of Transportation as the sector-specific agency with regard to transportation 
critical infrastructure.  It states, “Sector Specific Agencies are responsible for working to 
implement the VA Plan sector partnership model and risk management framework, 
develop protective programs and related requirements, and provide sector-level CIKR 
protection guidance” (p. 6).   
State and local transportation officials are expected to adopt the transportation 
sector and sub-sector national strategy.  It would be beyond the scope of this document to 
examine every individual state, locality, tribal and territorial highway security strategy.  
However, by simply examining a few of the strategic documents developed by 
transportation organizations, it appears the local and state transportation officials have 
expanded concerns far beyond those contained in national strategy documents and thus 
different strategic priorities with regard to highway security.  State and local highway 
agencies have expanded their highway protection strategies to include elements of 
prevention, response and recovery.   
The AASHTO report, entitled National Needs Assessment for Ensuring 
Transportation Infrastructure Security (2002), recognizes the strategic gap.  Although 
this document predates the most recent Transportation Sector Specific Plan, it expands 
upon state and local departments of transportation’s strategic role in highway critical 
infrastructure security.   The authors of this document describe the expanding role of state 
transportation workers as being more proactive in terrorism prevention.  Beyond target 
hardening measures, the AASHTO noted other prevention type strategies that are a 
natural segue since transportation workers are often in a position to observe and report 
unusual or suspicious behaviors.  In addition to prevention, AASHTO saw a need for 
highway security strategy for transportation workers in a new role: as first responders.  
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Explaining their viewpoint, the association reports state transportation departments have 
the expertise to reroute, restrict, or otherwise direct traffic after terrorist incidents, are 
instrumental in developing emergency routes for egress or ingress to affected areas, and 
state transportation departments have the capability to provide detection, surveillance, 
and monitoring over the highway network (p. 36). 
AASHTO views information sharing as a critical component of critical 
infrastructure protection strategy.  The researchers view information-sharing strategy on 
both the macro scale, such as the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN), as 
well as on the micro-scale in terms of information sharing among local agencies.  
Although the NIPP and subsequently the Transportation Sector Specific Plan mention 
the need for technological solutions and further research and development, they do not 
expand upon this theme, even with specific regard to highway security as denoted in 
Annex D.  However, the AASHTO has a more definitive strategy, and suggests 
transportation agencies capitalize on Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS), which is 
essentially technology used for traffic control and communications.    
In a subsequent report produced by the American Association of State Highway 
and Transportation Officials, entitled, Protecting Americas Roads, Bridges and Tunnels: 
The role of State DOT’s in Homeland Security (2005), they state, “The cost of failure to 
prepare for a terrorist attack that affects the nation’s transportation infrastructure, in terms 
of loss of life and economic destruction, would be catastrophic” (p. 2).   In this report, the 
AASHTO indicates the individual state Departments of Transportation (DOT) are 
expanding their strategy of critical asset protection.  The document reports state DOTs 
are incorporating strategic countermeasures that include deterrence and detection, and 
defense and design (designing new hardened structures).  AASHTO indicates the state 
DOTs will need $2.5 billion over the next six years to continue their plans to protect 
critical highway infrastructure.  If funding is available,  AASHTO’s future prevention 
strategy calls for retrofitting bridges with countermeasures such as blast shielding, 
structural reinforcement intrusion detection, reconstructing new bridges with more 
advanced design features to enhance blast survivability, providing enhanced detection 
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and surveillance capabilities in tunnels, as well as incorporating protective measures for 
sensitive areas along the tunnel, such as portals.  
The AASHTO provides the collaborative platform between and among state and 
local departments of transportation, and takes protection far beyond the national strategy 
documents into the realm of response and recovery.  The AASHTO’s strategic vision is 
clearly an improvement on the limited scope of the national strategy documents.  
However, there is still a void in defining how state and local transportation agencies will 
transition into this first-responder role.  The AASHTO is silent with regard to ensuring 
collaboration between other first responders and transportation workers; thus, it appears 
the issue of roles and responsibilities remains unresolved at the state and local level.   
This expanded role envisioned by the AASHTO is commendable, but lacking in 
details as to “how” this is accomplished.  There is no mention of how other partnerships 
are incorporated into the expanded roles.  For example, protection, prevention, response 
and recovery will require cooperation and collaboration well in advance of a crisis. Fire 
departments, EMS, law enforcement, private-sector transportation and transportation 
contractors are not mentioned as components of their strategy. If transportation workers 
are to become first responders, a strategic framework will need to address how 
transportation workers fit into the overall response and recovery plan.  There is no 
mention of enhanced training for transportation workers with regard to terrorism 
prevention or response that is critical to the safety of the workers and is a basic strategic 
element.  The AASHTOs central focus is garnering the funding for improvements and 
technology.     
Like the national strategy documents regarding the protection of the roadways and 
highway critical infrastructure, the AASHTO has failed to identify and incorporate 
critical partnerships outside of the realm of state and local transportation agencies.  This 
myopic strategy ignores the complex environment of homeland security.      
C. ACADEMIC VIEWS  
The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) is an organization consisting of 
progressive police executives. Their mission is to improve policing and advance 
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professionalism through research and involvement in public policy debate.  PERF put 
together a series facilitated discussions with law enforcement executives from across the 
nation regarding protecting the community from terrorism.   Though not specific to 
protecting our highways from terrorism, some of the strategies suggested by this group of 
law enforcement leaders can be universally applied, and are equally applicable to 
highway critical infrastructure as they are to the other facets of terrorism.  
Through the course of these facilitated discussions, the researchers concluded, 
“The threat of terrorism in America’s cities and towns, however, has revealed the critical 
need for improved coordination and resource sharing—whether personnel, equipment or 
information—to develop a formidable strategy to counter future acts of terrorism” 
(Murphy and Plotkin, 2003, p. 16).  The feedback provided by the executives revealed 
confusion over roles, uncertainty about responsibilities, breakdowns in communication 
and lack of trust plaguing effective partnership building, with terrorism merely 
complicating ruffled relationships.  The PERF researchers observed the need for 
collaboration and partnership strategies as an element of local homeland security, with 
the critical link between federal authorities and the public, is local law enforcement 
because no one has better direct ties with the community.    
In a subsequent forum, Davis and Plotkin (2005) noted that local law enforcement 
is the first line of defense against terrorism; they are uniquely positioned to protect 
communities by identifying critical infrastructure in their jurisdictions that are vulnerable 
to terrorist attacks. Yet there are no simple solutions for how DHS or other federal 
agencies can effectively coordinate with more than 17,000 decentralized local law 
enforcement agencies then integrate those efforts with all other relevant federal 
initiatives.  DHS provides strategic plans, outlines the vision and mission statements, core 
values, principles, strategic goals and objectives that guide daily DHS operations.  DHS 
is supposed to provide the federal homeland security coordination component, which 
appears to be lacking.  This assumes a partnership between DHS and local agencies in the 
protection of the nation against terrorism, which Davis and Plotkin argue does not 
universally exist.   
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At the conclusion of the executive forum and after analyzing the comments and 
suggestions of the participants, the researchers concluded,  
Any advances in securing our nation from terrorism must build on the 
successes of community policing and embrace its underlying principles. 
Creating and sustaining partnerships with law enforcement agencies at all 
levels of government, with other disciplines and with the public is 
essential in all efforts to prevent, prepare and respond to terrorism. (Davis 
and Plotkin, 2005, p. 75) 
The information gleaned by the PERF from law enforcement executives was 
analyzed by the researchers and reduced to recommendations regarding strategies for 
local law enforcement to protect their communities from terrorism.  The forums were 
local law enforcement centric; however, federal law enforcement and DHS were included 
in some of the forums.  Noticeably absent from the forum were members of the 
community, infrastructure stakeholders, first responders, and partner agencies.  The 
participants in these forums, designed to give police executives the way forward for 
developing strategy, were very narrowly created, omitted critical components that offer 
value and input into terrorism prevention at the local level.  Thus, the resulting strategic 
suggestions were narrowly structured based on the limited input. 
The law enforcement executives identified several strategic gaps in local efforts to 
prevent terrorism, which the PERF researchers reduced to concluding strategic 
recommendations for police executives to incorporate.  However, the way forward for 
implementing these strategies is not defined.  For example, identifying the barriers to 
communications between federal and local agencies does not ensure changes in strategy 
to improve communication.          
Brookings Institute researchers Howitt and Makler noted the extreme 
vulnerability of the surface transportation network and the role of surface transportation 
in terms of emergency response system and an essential element in recovering from an 
act of terrorism in their study, On the Ground: Protecting America’s Roads and Transit 
Against Terrorism (2005).  The researchers found our government has not made surface 
transportation a high homeland security priority, providing limited funding to state and 
local governments for protective enhancements to surface transportation security while 
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placing a significant portion of the funding emphasis on aviation security.  The 
researchers observed state and local officials vary widely with regard to perceived 
highway security concerns and, therefore, their strategies with regard to prevention, 
response and mitigation is reflective of this perception posture.  In general, Howitt and 
Makler found state and local officials identified mass transit and highways as a lower 
priority among the many security issues demanding attention.  They observe state budget 
constraints further limit the scope and scale of the response.  In most states, two agencies 
took the initiative on transportation security: state departments of transportation, with 
responsibility for the physical infrastructure of major roadways and related facilities, and 
the state police, typically with responsibility for highway safety and law enforcement.   
As a result of their analysis on the current state of highway security, Howitt and 
Makler made several broad strategic recommendations to improve the state of surface 
transportation security.  These include increasing funding to states and localities for 
surface transportation security, making provisions for accessibility trade off, using 
technology to address prevention and implementing emergency preparedness strategies.  
The researchers suggest the federal government will need to enhance its role by providing 
funding to the states and localities, adding transportation officials need to step up to the 
table in lieu of taking a back seat role by developing stronger and more effective voices 
in state decision making and resource allocation.   
Howitt and Makler call for reexamination of the openness of our highway system.  
Not so much in general terms, but in the event of a large scale attack.  The authors simply 
suggest these discussions, in terms of strategy, need to occur in advance of a crisis and 
should not occur in a vacuum. 
Howitt and Makler argue the federal government has a significant role in setting 
technology strategy with regards to how the states and localities incorporate 
technological solutions into their highway security planning.  The authors argue federal 
government should identify and test technological innovations, set standards and provide 
technical assistance, thus paving the way for sound, universal security practices. 
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Howitt and Makler’s final strategy recommendation acknowledges prevention 
will not always be successful.  Therefore, emergency response, consequence management 
and recovery must be incorporated into surface transportation security strategy.  
Transportation agencies have to look beyond awareness and focus on ways to build 
deeper capacities.  Transportation agencies should also be better linked to other agencies 
outside the transportation purview to include major private corporations or nonprofit 
organizations (pp. 11–13). 
Howitt and Makler’s central theme is garnering more federal funding to secure the 
roadways.  They argue that through this increased funding, surface transportation security 
could benefit from technological enhancements.  However, the authors make this 
determination without identifying how technology could be utilized to address highway 
security.    
Additionally, the two researchers argue transportation agencies need to embrace 
emergency response, consequence management and incident recovery.  These broad 
strategies are not explored further; thus, their research is void of detail on exactly what 
role transportation agencies are expected to play in consequence management and 
incident recovery, as well as how transportation workers fit into the scheme of first 
responders.    Without further defining the elements and responsibilities of these roles, 
interpretation is left to the reader.  To provide uniform utility across transportation 
agencies and first responder communities, these strategies need to be defined with more 
specificity and detail.  Overall, Howitt and Makler’s strategy recommendations are too 
broad to be useful for transportation organizations as well as law enforcement officials.   
D. IED STRATEGIES 
Corderre and Register (2009) call IEDs the most dangerous emerging threat 
United States law enforcement agencies will encounter.  They make the point that IEDs 
are not confined to the Middle East, and attribute their prominence among foreign 
terrorist to being cheap, lethal and low tech.  Corderre and Register describe IEDs as 
effective because they are weapons of mass influence; an IED has the ability to create an 
atmosphere of fear and uncertainty. 
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In terms of protecting our highways from terrorism, according to Mineta 
Transportation Institute researchers Jenkins, Butterworth, Poe, Reeves, Schrum and 
Trella (2010), the IED is the tactic most likely to be used by terrorist.  Flammable liquids, 
gases or explosive materials would be the most likely ingredients used to cause damage 
to highway infrastructure in a terrorist attack.  The heat created by such a fire has the 
greatest potential to inflict structural failure.  Recall the collapse of the twin towers on 
September 11, 2001.  Civil engineers Bazant and Zhou conducted an analysis of the 
collapse, Why Did the World Trade Center Collapse?—Simple Analysis (2001), and 
concluded the physical collapse of these structures was caused by the heat created by the 
fire of the burning jet fuel (pp. 1–2).   However, the literature regarding strategies for 
either transportation agencies or law enforcement officials to address this threat to our 
highways is currently non-existent.   
Hoffman, Brannan, Herren and Matthiessen, of the RAND Corporation, offer IED 
strategies in the form of suicide bombers in their research, Preparing for Suicide 
Terrorism: A Primer for Law Enforcement Agencies and Officers (2004).  The 
researchers state, “The spread of suicide terrorism worldwide suggests that the United 
States will not remain immune from this threat” (p. 1). 
Although not specific to the threat of potential use of suicide terrorism on our 
highways, the research is applicable across any venue, such as critical infrastructures to 
include the highways, as this tactic can be effective on the highways.  Just as terrorists 
used hijacked planes to commit suicide terrorism, vehicles, especially trucks loaded with 
flammable materials, make a ready-made suicide bomb. 
Acknowledging the potential use of suicide terrorism in the United States, 
Hoffman et al. note the relative lack of experience our country has with regard to suicide 
terrorism.  For this reason, the researchers look at two countries with extensive 
experience, Israel and Sri Lanka, for lessons learned in terms of strategies the police in 




• Training police officers on how to identify the indicators of a possible 
suicide terrorist, how to confront the potential suicide bomber and how to 
respond in the event of a suicide bombing attack.  This includes 
developing policy, procedures and rehearsing these procedures so officers 
are familiar with the decisions he/she is empowered to make without 
seeking permission or calling for specialized units. 
• Train first responders on how to gather intelligence in the immediate 
aftermath of an attack. 
• Build cooperation with the local community and businesses.  Suicide 
terrorist may come from local communities, cultivating strong ties with 
community leaders opening communication lines.  Police should cultivate 
relationships with businesses that sell the precursors to bomb making 
materials and encourage alerting authorities when individuals purchase 
unusual or large purchases. 
• Police agencies should create counterterrorism units. 
• Reduce the potential for shrapnel in and around potential targets. 
• Encourage the assistance of citizens by providing them specifics with what 
they should be aware of and who to call in the event of noticing something 
out of place. 
• Create concentric rings of defense in highly vulnerable areas during 
special events or around high value targets. 
Their research is unique in that it addresses a much-needed void in the literature 
with regard to suicide terrorism, especially when signs and governmental warning 
indicate this tactic will emerge in the United States.  However, the strategies proposed 
within the literature fail to acknowledge the role of vital pre-existing law enforcement 
partnerships in the public safety community in the prevention and response to suicide 
terrorism.  Although engaging the local community and business is one strategy 
suggested by these researchers, their purpose of engaging the local community and 
businesses appears to focus on the ability of the local community to provide valuable 
intelligence to the police with regard to identifying potential terrorist and terrorist type 
activities. This is an important strategic component; however it falls short of expanding 
the role of the police in educating other members of the public safety community, and in 
particular the first responder community and the employees who work in and around high 
target areas regarding suicide terrorism tactics. 
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The RAND researchers make assumptions about the presence of the police at the 
attack site, ultimately assuming the attack will occur at a major event or a place where 
heavy police presence is routine, such as a high profile target.  This assumption offers no 
strategic solutions for places where police presence is nonexistent at the time of the 
attack.   Suicide terrorists in particular are the ultimate smart bomb and may seek targets 
where there is no police presence.  The strategy proposed by Hoffman et al regarding 
concentric rings of defense will only come into play after the police have had an 
opportunity to respond or in high profile events where police are naturally present.  The 
police may not be on the scene in the moments after an attack.  In the ensuing mayhem 
employees of the infrastructure will inevitably attempt to come to the aid of the injured 
and unknowingly placing themselves in grave danger of secondary devices.  Firefighters 
and other first responders will unwittingly do the same.  Concentric rings of defense are 
designed to minimize victimization to include victimization of the rescuers. In the 
absence of this strategy what are the strategic options for other first responders to 
minimize risk?  
The strategies proposed by the researchers falls short in acknowledging the 
strategic role police agencies play as the subject matter experts in terrorism tactics in 
educating local first responders as well as employees who work in or around vulnerable  
IED (suicide terrorism) target areas.   First responders in particular must be educated 
beyond being able to identify suspicious activity before and after a blast.  The RAND 
researchers fail to grasp that IED strategies, whether devoted to suicide bombers or 
otherwise, must be multidisciplinary to be successful.   
E. CONCLUSION 
There is very limited literature dedicated to law enforcement strategies for the 
protection of the highways and highway critical infrastructures.  The national strategy 
documents as well the state and local strategies are specifically devoted to highway 
security and protection of highway critical infrastructure, however the audience for these 
documents is transportation stakeholders, not law enforcement.  Scholarly assessments 
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are written in terms of general terrorism prevention, directed at strategies to be 
incorporated by the police, or directly address the vulnerabilities on our highways and are 
therefore directed at transportation officials.   
Since IEDs remain a concern of our intelligence officials who report this tactic 
will be used by terrorist on our soil, strategies to address this tactic were included in the 
literature review.  Despite these warnings concerning this tactic, there is little scholarly 
and no governmental literature devoted IED strategies.  This is either a testament to the 
limited research in this area or the lack of unclassified information available in open 
source documents.   
Terrorism strategies, whether devoted to highway security or otherwise, are 
written for one specific audience. Often it is the direct stakeholders (in this case 
transportation officials) or the police but not both.  Where the literature is lacking is in 
strategies that acknowledge and subsequently incorporate the myriad of groups and 
community members who can play a role in preventing, responding to, and recovering 
from a terrorist attack on our roadways and highway critical infrastructure.  In this sense, 
the limited literature is myopic because it fails to bridge the audiences necessary for 








III. ENGAGING THE PUBLIC IN TERRORISM PREVENTION 
 The National Strategy for Homeland Security (2002) calls upon the American 
people to do their part to protect the homeland.  Specifically the Strategy encourages 
volunteerism and personal preparedness (p. 11). Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive 8 (HSPD 8) defines preparedness as the existence of plans, training and 
equipment necessary at the federal, state, local level to maximize the ability to prevent, 
protect, respond to, and recover from major events (HSPD 8, 2003).  The National 
Strategy for Homeland Security defines the four goals of homeland security as 
prevention, protection, response and recovery (DHS, 2007, p. 1).  The definition of 
prevention is contained in HSPD 8: “activities undertaken by the first responder 
community during the early stages of an incident to reduce the likelihood or 
consequences of threatened or actual terrorist attacks” (HSPD 8, 2003).   
Citizen involvement in terrorism prevention is ill defined in any of the homeland 
security strategy documents.  The inaugural National Strategy for Homeland Security, 
states, “Every American must be willing to do his or her part to protect our homeland.”  
In qualifying this assessment, the document expands upon the need for volunteers and 
personal preparedness for a terrorist attack.  With regard to prevention, the Strategy 
reserves this activity for truck drivers, train conductors, ship captains and utility workers 
in the form of suspicious activity reporting (Office of Homeland Security, 2002, p. 12). 
The subsequent 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security looks at 
prevention from a strategic and tactical perspective, such as calling for border security 
initiatives designed to keep terrorists and weapons of mass destruction out of the country, 
disrupting terrorist and their capacity to operate in the United States, and preventing 
radicalization in the United States.  Throughout the prevention section of the National 
Strategy for Homeland Security, the prevention strategies are thrust upon law 




(DHS, 2007, pp. 15–23).  Community engagement is only mentioned in the context of 
engaging the Muslim community as partners in the War on Terror.    Prevention, it seems, 
is the duty of the authorities. 
The Quadrennial Homeland Security Review report (2010) defined five homeland 
security missions (p. i): 
• Preventing terrorism and enhancing security 
• Securing and managing our borders 
• Enforcing and Administering Our Immigration Laws 
• Safeguarding and Securing Cyberspace 
• Ensuring resilience to disasters 
The Quadrennial Review also puts the responsibility of prevention on the 
shoulders of the authorities.  Prevention of terrorism in this document is less strategic and 
more conceptual, with broad objectives such as understanding the threat, deterring and 
disrupting operations, protecting against terrorist capability, etc.  Engaging the 
community is one objective listed: 
Individual citizens and cohesive communities are key partners in the 
homeland security enterprise and have an essential role to play in 
countering terrorism.  Mechanisms for identifying and reporting 
suspicious activities must be made clear and accessible. (DHS, 2010, pp. 
38–39)   
As to how this is accomplished, the document is silent. 
Strom, Hollywood, Pope, Weintraub, Daye and Gemeinhardt, researchers for the 
Institute for Homeland Security Solutions, conducted an analysis of 86 foiled and 
executed terrorist plots in the United States between 1999 and 2009.  Their analysis 
revealed 40 percent were discovered through suspicious activity reporting from the 
general public (Strom et al., 2010, p. 19).   Their research illustrates the value of citizen 
involvement and provides quantitative data to support this finding.   
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In the years following 9/11, and the relative absence of a large-scale, mass-
casualty terrorist attack on our nation, garnering citizen involvement in terrorism 
prevention has become more challenging.  As a nation, our collective memory of the 
tragic events of September 11, 2001, has begun to fade, leaving terrorism in the 
background as other issues challenging our nation evolve and take precedent.   
A study conducted by Davis and Silver, political scientists and researchers from 
Michigan State University, illustrates the waning concern of a terrorist attack.  Davis and 
Silver conducted a survey of Michigan residents to determine their level of concern for a 
terrorist attack.  In the spring of 2002, just months after the 9/11 attacks, 83% of 
Michigan residents were “somewhat” or “very concerned” about another terrorist attack 
in the United States.  By the winter of 2004, this number had dropped to 67% of 
Michigan residents responding they were “somewhat” or “very concerned” about another 
terrorist attack in the United States (Davis and Silver, 2004, pp. 1–2).  Although Davis 
and Silver’s survey is Michigan centric, it nonetheless illustrates wavering American 
attitudes about the terrorism potential on American soil.  Their study concluded in 2004, 
as time has placed even more distance between the catastrophic events of 9/11 and today, 
it is likely this downward trend will continue until the next attack. 
Since the inception of homeland security, terrorism prevention from the 
perspective of general public involvement in the United States has been overlooked at the 
national level.  The national strategy documents mention the importance of the public in 
terrorism prevention; however, the documents are silent as to how this is accomplished.  
These documents give the reader the sense that prevention is a task for the authorities, 
such as the Department of Homeland Security, the police and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation.  Since there is no centralized coordination at the national level, public 
involvement programs have been left to individual governmental and nongovernmental 
agencies to initiate, develop and coordinate.   Terrorism prevention, in the form of citizen 
involvement models, has emerged in disjointed independent programs with emphasis on 
suspicious activity reporting campaigns.   
Capitalizing on the strength of the masses, especially in the United States, remains 
an elusive goal, as terrorism on our home turf is slowly eroding from our collective 
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memory.  Public engagement is necessary and an important part of terrorism prevention.   
Any successful strategy designed to prevent terrorism on our highways (or anywhere) 
must include a citizen involvement component.  
Creating a successful public involvement strategy begins with an assessment of 
existing programs.  This thesis uses comparative case studies of four existing citizen 
involvement models designed as a means to prevent terrorism.  The case studies evaluate 
the citizen involvement models in four areas:  how and by which entity the program is 
implemented; how the program is solicited to the public to encourage public 
participation; the success of the program in terms of achieving the public’s assistance; 
and the cost of implementing the citizen engagement program.   The purpose of 
conducting these case studies is to access existing citizen involvement models in terms of 
applicability to citizen involvement in highway security strategies.  These models 
included in this case study are the America’s Waterway Watch program, the See 
Something Say Something Program, the First Observer program and the United 
Kingdom’s centralized Prevent Strategy.   
A. AMERICA’S WATERWAY WATCH PROGRAM 
The United States Coast Guard’s America’s Waterway Watch program is a public 
outreach program designed to capitalize on the observations of the people who live, work 
or play on or around America’s waterways.  The program’s website 
(http://aww.aww-sp.com/) illustrates the need for citizen engagement in terrorism 
prevention on our vast maritime critical infrastructures: 
America’s coast, rivers, bridges, ports, ships, military bases and waterside 
industries may be the terrorists’ next targets.  Though waterway security is 
better than ever, with more than 95,000 miles of shoreline, over 290,000 
square miles of water, and approximately 70 million recreational boaters 
in the United States, the Coast Guard and local first responders cannot do 
the job alone.  
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1. Program Implementation  
Launched in 2003, the program has a two-pronged outreach; the USCG Reservist 
concentrate on businesses and government organizations, while the USCG Auxiliary 
targets recreational waterway users.  The program encourages recreational boaters, 
marina operators and dock managers to contact the USCG or the local police if they 
observe suspicious behavior on or around ports, docks, marinas, riversides, beaches and 
waterfront communities.    Informational brochures, boat decals, and reporting forms are 
distributed during vessel inspections and public safety boating courses.  Posters and 
brochures are distributed to marinas and commercial businesses near the waterways 
(USCG, 2005, pp. 2–4)    
2. Soliciting Public Participation 
The America’s Waterway Watch program is unique in contrast to many other 
public suspicious activity reporting programs.  It appeals individuals to tap into a 
heightened sense of awareness in a meaningful and productive way through the inclusion 
of a web-based educational component.  The America’s Waterway Watch website offers 
various descriptive examples illustrative of suspicious activity and defines where citizens 
should be particularly observant of suspicious activity, such as around bridges, tunnels, in 
and around passenger terminals, chemical or industrial facilities and government 
facilities.  In addition to the information printed on the webpage, the USCG provides a 
link to a short training video that demonstrates different types of suspicious activity 
around waterways.  The brochures and posters encourage citizens to contact the local 
police by dialing 911 or the Coast Guard National Response Center Hotline via a toll free 
number.  The United States Coast Guard’s public outreach suspicious activity reporting 
campaign has managed to add specificity without complicating the message by taking the 
concept of observe and report a step further to include what to look for, where to look, 
and who to call (Evans, 2002,  p. 22). 
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3. Achieving Public Involvement 
Ryan Owens, chief of the Coast Guard’s Industry Information and Outreach 
Branch, reported that in 2010, the Coast Guard logged 3,000 hours of outreach regarding 
the America’s Waterway Watch program, and the National Response Center received 
about 26,000 calls (Collins, 2011). 
4. Cost of Implementation 
The America’s Waterway Watch program offers a multifaceted approach by 
reaching out to businesses and to private citizens.  This model is unique and therefore 
interesting because part of the program is administered by a volunteer arm of the United 
States Coast Guard and is therefore an inexpensive approach to garnering public 
involvement in homeland security.  Despite the fact personnel cost are in part minimized 
by using the auxiliary and reservist, the Coast Guard is allocated $3 million annually to 
administer the program (United States Senate Bill 3659, 2010). 
B. SEE SOMETHING, SAY SOMETHING 
New York City’s Metropolitan Transit Authority’s (MTA) launched their See 
Something, Say Something program in 2003.  This security campaign depends on heavy 
marketing in and around MTA assets to include the subway system, buses and trains.  
The See Something, Say Something program encourages the public to get involved if they 
see something suspicious by reporting the suspicious activity.  It should be noted the See 
Something, Say Something tagline is licensed, but MTA has permitted 54 organizations 
worldwide to use the tagline free of charge for public awareness campaigns about 
security.  Therefore, many homeland security-minded agencies and organizations, 
including the Department of Homeland Security, has adopted the See Something, Say 
Something mantra.  
1. Program Implementation 
At its heart, See Something, Say Something is a no frills, simple public 
involvement campaign.  The phrase itself, coupled with the constant state of alert, 
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reminds citizens of their need to maintain vigilance in a city with an ample terrorism 
history.  Thus, there is no citizen training associated with See Something, Say Something.   
2. Soliciting Public Participation 
See Something, Say Something depends on heavy marketing in the form of 
advertising designed to solicit the support and participation of the public. 
DHS released a See Something Say Something video in early 2011.  The video 
shows people observing suspicious activity and reporting it to the police and offers an 
explanation on how the tips are processed by law enforcement agencies.  
3. Achieving Public Involvement 
With so many organizations adopting the See Something Say Something 
campaign, gathering statistics with regard to the quantity and quality of reporting is 
difficult.  However, the New York Times reports the New York City hotline received 
8,999 calls in 2006.  This included a significant number of calls about suspicious 
packages, many in the transit system. Most involved backpacks, briefcases or other items 
accidentally left behind by their owners.  In 2007, the hotline received 13,473 calls, with 
644 of those meriting investigation (Neuman, 2008). 
In terms of success, The Wall Street Journal reports the See Something Say 
Something campaign was responsible for the actions of an alert citizen who contacted the 
authorities regarding a sport utility vehicle abandoned by Faisal Shahzad on May 1, 2010, 
as he attempted to detonate a vehicle-borne IED in Times Square (Grossman, 2010). 
4. Cost of Implementation 
New York City has a history of terrorism beginning with the first attack on the 
World Trade Center in 1993.  Not only was New York City one of the primary targets of 
al Qaeda on September 11, 2001, it remains in al Qaeda’s sites as they continue to 
attempt to inspire attacks in New York City.  New York City is therefore the recipient of 
substantial federal homeland security dollars, to include $151 million in Urban Area 
Security Initiative (UASI) funding in 2010 (McCarter, 2011).  With a total of 
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$662,622,100 allocated to UASI grants across the United States, New York City receives 
23 percent of all UASI funding (FEMA, 2011).  The New York City’s Metropolitan 
Transit Authority receives between $3–$4 million from DHS to fund the See Something, 
Say Something campaign each year (Neuman, 2008).    
C. FIRST OBSERVER 
The Department of Homeland Security provides funding and the Transportation 
Security Administration provides oversight of the First Observer program.  The First 
Observer program is a security awareness program specifically for highway professionals 
in support of the National Preparedness Guidelines, and is designed to protect critical 
transportation assets. The program recruits volunteers from the trucking, motor coach and 
school bus industries to act as a “First Observer” in reporting suspicious activities on our 
roadways of either a criminal or potential terroristic nature to authorities 
(firstobserver.com).   
1. Program Implementation 
The First Observer program is an interesting model in that it is federally funded 
by a grant, but administered by the private sector.  Originally conceived as the Highway 
Watch program and administered by the American Trucking Association (ATA), the 
Highway Watch program came under heavy fire, accused of catering to members of the 
ATA.  Realizing the program was not managed properly, the Transportation Security 
Administration put the program out for competitive bids, with HMS Corporation 
receiving the contract (Morasch, 2009).  HMS describes their expertise as program 
management within the public safety, homeland defense and emergency management 
sector (firstobserver.com).   
2 Soliciting Public Participation 
First Observer provides a web-based training platform with modules specific to 
various transportation partners in lieu of the general public.  These modules include 
general trucking and motor coach training, school bus training, law enforcement, cargo, 
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highway critical infrastructure/key resources, hazardous materials, highway workers, 
ports, truck rental and leasing, parking facility and Operation Secure Transport training.  
The website offers homeland security news, publications and articles specific to 
transportation security (firstobserver.com, 2009).   
3. Achieving Public Involvement 
HMS operates a toll-free call center for suspicious activity reporting.  Information 
is entered into a secure database and transferred to TSA Information Sharing and 
Analysis Center.  Director of Security Operations Doug Morris reports 6,100 calls made 
to First Observer by truckers, with a total of 254 calls resulting in investigations by law 
enforcement or federal authorities (www.truckflix.com). 
4. Cost of Implementation 
In 2004, the Department of Homeland Security allocated $21 million to launch 
the Highway Watch Program (DHS, 2004). Over the years, and under the revamped and 
renamed First Observer program, HMS’s contract with TSA spans three years with a 
price tag of $15.5 million (Patton, 2009). 
D. PREVENT      
In the United Kingdom, terrorism prevention in terms of public involvement 
campaigns has expanded well beyond suspicious activity reporting.  The United Kingdom 
has implemented a citizen involvement model that is administered by the central 
government. 
In July 2006, Her Majesty’s Government released Countering International 
Terrorism: The United Kingdom’s Strategy.  This document acknowledged the evolution 
of terrorism within the United Kingdom moving from a domestic threat—stemming from 
the longstanding “troubles” with Northern Ireland—to the more recent radicalized 
elements of the Islamic faith.   The report calls Islamic terrorism “serious and sustained” 
and describes Islamic terrorists as posing a continuous threat to the United Kingdom, her 
citizens and her interest abroad (Her Majesty’s Government, 2006, p. 1).    The United 
 44 
Kingdom’s counterterrorism policy, originally implemented in 2003, is known as 
CONTEST, and has four principal strands defined as follows:  
• Prevent – to stop people from becoming terrorist or supporting violent extremism 
• Pursue – to stop terrorist acts 
• Protect – to strengthen our protection against terrorist acts 
• Prepare – where an attack cannot be stopped, to mitigate its impact 
Of the four “Ps,” the Prevent strand is most focused on citizen involvement and is 
therefore be the focus of this case study.   
Prevention, according to Countering International Terrorism: The United 
Kingdom’s Strategy, is achieved by addressing the issues of the disadvantaged—such as 
inequalities and discrimination by supporting reform, deterring those who facilitate 
terrorism by changing the environment in which they operate, and by engaging in a battle 
of ideas by challenging violent extremist ideologies and by supporting Muslims who wish 
to dispute Islamic extremism (Her Majesty’s Government, 2006, pp. 1–2).  This report 
stresses the importance of working together and citizen involvement:  
Perhaps the most important of all these partnerships is between these 
bodies, led by the Government and our citizens and communities.  Public 
awareness of the threat, understanding of the measures needed to combat it 
and active support and cooperation with the police are critical to the 
success of the strategy. (Her Majesty’s Government, 2006, p. 3)   
The report concludes by reminding citizens the government’s strategy is dependent upon 
everyone contributing to its success.  It encourages people to work within their 
community to counter those who seek radicalization and terrorist violence, be alert to 
their surroundings and report suspicious activity to the anti-terrorism hotline (Her 
Majesty’s Government, 2006, p. 33). 
1. Program Implementation 
This strategy document does not explain how the elements of CONTEST, 
specifically the Prevent strategy, are to be implemented in the real world.  
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Implementation of the Prevent strategy is defined more thoroughly in Her Majesty’s 
Government The Prevent Strategy: A Guide for Local Partners in England (2008).  In 
this document, the duty of Prevent as defined in the CONTEST strategy falls on every 
level of government. However, local authorities are expected to take the lead, with the 
central government playing a relatively minor role in the process.   
2. Soliciting Public Participation 
Prevent is a holistic approach that involves not just suspicious activity reporting, 
but also all aspects of the community, recognizing that preventing violent extremism 
embraces the experience, energy and ideas of the entire community.  It calls for a jointly 
agreed-upon community plan of action specific to the unique needs and problems 
identified by the community. This coordinated response challenges the leadership of the 
community, such as the police, social services, cultural services, sports and leisure 
services, and health services to implement these community-based programs.  However, 
it is up to each community to determine who/which agencies will be included in their 
community’s Prevent program. Prevent’s community engagement model is an 
individualized, tailored approach developed by local partnerships and supported by the 
central government. However, the overarching emphasis is for communities to develop 
their own strategies to deal with the emergence of radicalized Islamic extremists.  The 
Prevent strategy has five key objectives (p. 6): 
• Challenging the violent extremist ideology and supporting mainstream 
voices 
• Disrupting those who promote violent extremism  
• Supporting individuals who are being targeted/recruited to the cause of 
violent extremism 
• Increasing the resilience of communities to violent extremism 
• Addressing the grievances the ideologues are exploiting 
3. Achieving Public Involvement 
The Prevent Strategy: A Guide for Local Partners in England provides 
suggestions for how to address each of the aforementioned objectives.  However, since 
the concept is for each community to create an individualized approach, how the 
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objectives are implemented is left to each affected community.   Examples of successful 
community programs are included in The Prevent Strategy: A Guide for Local Partners 
in England.  For example, listed under the first objective, “challenging the violent 
extremist ideology and supporting mainstream voices,” were several short excerpts on 
what other communities had implemented as part of the Prevent program.  One excerpt 
explains how the City of Birmingham worked with British Muslim organizations to 
enable conventional Muslim Imams to reconnect with youth by discussing mainstream 
Islam.  These Imams were viewed as authoritative voices, mentors and teachers by 
countering the arguments of radical Islam.    
Although the Prevent local strategy appears to be a bottom-up approach to 
preventing terrorism, it is actually hierarchical in form with the central government 
playing a role by providing funding support in the form of research, analysis, information 
sharing, awareness of terrorism radicalization trends, and providing training materials (p. 
41).  Prevent coordination in the context of CONTEST is also the responsibility of the 
central government and is accomplished through the Office for Security and Counter 
Terrorism within the Home Office. 
4. Cost of Implementation 
The centralized approach with local implementation in the form of the United 
Kingdom’s Prevent program comes with a tremendous price tag.  The cost to maintain 
the Prevent program is $230 million annually (Power, 2009).   
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IV. MOVING FORWARD 
A. WHERE WE ARE NOW: AN ANALYSIS OF CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT 
MODELS 
The four citizen terrorism prevention involvement models were chosen because 
they represent different approaches in soliciting citizen participation in homeland 
security.  Two target a specific citizenry, the third takes a much broader approach by 
soliciting help from the citizenry at large, while the final model looks at a holistic 
approach applied in the United Kingdom where the community creates community-
specific ways of preventing terrorism.     Each model has its particular strengths and 
weaknesses.  
The America’s Waterway Watch program offers training specific to suspicious 
activity on and around waterways.  The United States Coast Guard has the luxury of 
having an auxiliary arm and reservist who can administer the program at little cost.  
However, the America’s Waterway Watch falls short by not including local law 
enforcement agencies in their program.  The demographic targeted by the America’s 
Waterway Watch campaign are instructed to contact either the Coast Guard or local 
police by dialing 911.  The assumption is the police are inherently aware of what 
observations could be construed as potential terrorism activity around the waterways.  In 
fact, police agencies may not train their personnel on specific terrorism trends on and 
around the waterways, since this is generally the jurisdiction of the United States Coast 
Guard or state game commission.  Furthermore, the local police agencies must be 
familiar with the program, since it is occurring within or alongside their jurisdictions, and 
there is an expectation from both the public and the United States Coast Guard of a police 
response.   
It is the simplicity of the See Something, Say Something Campaign that is 
appealing.  However, See Something, Say Something is not without its flaws.  Unlike the 
America’s Waterway Watch program, the MTA or the DHS See Something, Say 
Something model does not define suspicious activity.  This is left to be interpreted by the 
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millions of transit users.  People are left to interpret suspicious behavior using their own 
judgment.  This may explain why, of the 13,473 suspicious activity calls received 
pursuant to the New York campaign, only 644 were worthy of investigation.  Valuable 
time is spent vetting the reports, adding to the overall cost of the program.  Despite the 
simple message, the MTA campaign is expensive.  The Metropolitan Transit Authority 
receives $3–$4 million from DHS to fund the See Something, Say Something campaign 
each year (Neuman, 2008).   The luxury of DHS funding is not universally shared.   
The First Observer program is specifically dedicated to preventing terrorism on 
our highways by targeting a certain audience, such as highway workers, bus drivers, 
parking attendants and truck drivers.  This program is difficult to assess due to lack of 
available statistics to support (or oppose) the continued utility of First Observer.  
Additionally, the program limits itself by targeting only specific groups.  There appears 
to be no effort to incorporate the 308 million people who use the highways and other 
transportation assets into this suspicious activity program.  Failure to market this program 
to a broader spectrum of highway users is a weakness of this program.  The general 
public could add to the value and utility of this program, especially since the First 
Observer program provides an educational component missing in most suspicious 
activity reporting programs. 
The United Kingdom’s Prevent model reaches across a broad spectrum in its 
efforts to prevent terrorism.  Prevent’s strength is in its ability to allow the communities 
to be deeply engrained in program development; it therefore creates valuable buy-in at 
the local level.  This element is often missing in generalized suspicious activity 
campaigns designed to prevent terrorism, especially in the United States.  However, 
Prevent’s central focus appears to be on the individual in lieu of preventing terrorism in 
the grander scheme, such as attacks on critical infrastructure.  Perhaps this is a reflection 
of the uniqueness of the United Kingdom’s concern for radicalization within the 
community.   
Several important aspects of these models could potentially provide a base upon 
which to build a citizen involvement model for prevention of terrorism on our roadways 
and highway critical infrastructure.   
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First and foremost, educating the public about terrorism and terrorist tactics seems 
to be an elusive concept, predominantly because, in the United States, documents 
describing potential signs of terrorism are often labeled “Law Enforcement Sensitive,” 
“Official Use Only,” or a more stringent classification.  Our nation and our police in 
particular need all the help they can get from our citizens in collective efforts to prevent 
terrorism on our highways (or elsewhere).  Programs like First Observer and America’s 
Waterway Watch have provided us with a profound lesson regarding ways to provide 
meaningful information designed to educate the public on what is “suspicious,” without 
compromising the integrity of sensitive information.  
See Something, Say Something has become a catch phrase for terrorism 
prevention, not just in New York City, but also across the United States and beyond. The 
lesson for success gleaned from the See Something, Say Something campaign is in its 
simple message; it reminds people of the need to be constantly vigilant, that terrorists still 
want to destroy us, and the police want to be bothered by you when you see something 
out of place. 
The Prevent model is in opposition to the assumptions of the United States 
government that terrorism prevention programs must come from the government and be 
administered by the authorities.  Prevent takes terrorism prevention out of the hands of 
the authorities, where it has been firmly entrenched in the United States, and puts 
terrorism prevention in the hands of the local community.  Prevent’s lesson is that it 
shows that terrorism prevention is really about inclusion.  Prevent’s approach allows for 
the development of strong partnerships, while simultaneously allowing the local 
community to identify strategies for terrorism prevention. 
Although the United Kingdom has achieved a national-level prevention program, 
a concept that eludes the United States, Prevent is an extremely expensive prevention 
program with constant reoccurring expenses necessary for maintaining the program. 
As illustrated, none of the citizen engagement models truly represent where we 
need to be as a nation in terms of garnering and maintaining the public’s involvement 
with terrorism prevention on the highways.  The various public engagement models are 
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merely homeland security strategies put into action. The disjointed, independent 
programs illustrate in microcosm the fundamental flaws in homeland security strategy, in 
particular with regard to strategies for the protection of highway and highway critical 
infrastructure.  
B. WHERE WE NEED TO BE 
In his book, The Age of the Unthinkable, Joshua Cooper Ramo (2009) stated,  
We all remember Charles Darwin for explaining the process of evolution, 
but his notebooks also contained pages of failed attempts to bring math to 
bear on the chaos of ecological development, a reminder that even genius 
hits a wall from time to time. (p. 43)    
Darwin failed in his attempt to explain evolution in terms of a mathematical equation 
because he was not taking into account unexpected shocks within the ecosystem.  These 
unexpected shocks, or complexities, are not unique to nature. 
Per Bak, a Danish physicist and biologist, studied the sand pile as a new way of 
looking at the underlying physics of the world.  A small cone-shaped pile of sand appears 
stable; however, it is unstable and unpredictable.  Adding a few more grains of sand may 
only add to the pile, or may cause a complete avalanche, shifting the sands both interior 
and exterior to the collapsing sand pile.  Bak, through his experimentation, learned 
neither physics nor mathematics could explain what was going to happen to the sand pile 
next (Ramo, 2009, p. 53).   
Bak’s experiment illustrates the complexities our nation faces as we forge ahead 
in this quest to achieve homeland security. Homeland security is not unlike evolution or 
the sand pile.  It is a complex environment in a constant state of evolution.  The 
asymmetry of terrorism, the effects of globalization, the redefining of roles, the vastness 
of the United States, and the openness of our nation are just some of the myriad of 
factors, or grains of sand, creating complexity and adding to the heaping sand pile.  
This complexity, the constantly falling grains of sand in the prevention of 
terrorism on our highways’ sand pile, has never been a factor in our highway security 
strategy.  This research has illustrated the inability of our federal, state and local 
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governments, the private sector and academics to grasp this extremely complex 
environment.  This inability to understand complexity is reflected in strategies designed 
to protect the highways and critical highway infrastructure.  Strategies designed to protect 
our highways are completely disjointed and are either designed for transportation 
agencies or law enforcement agencies, but not both.  None of the strategies incorporate a 
holistic approach by including the citizenry at large or even some of the other agencies 
within the homeland security enterprise.  As a result, the public engagement programs 
created across the nation designed to involve citizens in terrorism prevention are 
reflective of highway security strategies and are also created without a firm 
understanding of the complex homeland security environment.  Attempts to engage the 
public in the prevention of terrorism have resulted in programs that are generally myopic 
because they only reach out to a certain demographic, or they are so broad they result in 
an over-reporting of suspicious activity.    
Because homeland security is a dynamic network of complex systems, to manage 
risk, homeland security leaders and our governments must learn to adapt to these 
complexities. These adaptations must be reflected in homeland security strategies, like 
those created by DHS, and state and local agencies regarding highway security.  If our 
strategies are reflective of these complexities, then the tactical solutions, such as public 
engagement programs, must also incorporate the complexities. 
It must begin with our national strategies with regard to highway security and 
reflect across state and local governments, since they own most of the highways and the 
highway critical infrastructure.  The NIPP and subsequent transportation sector and sub-
sector–specific strategies acknowledge the interconnectedness of the nation’s critical 
infrastructures.  However, they somehow seem to forget that strategies to address the 
sectors must reflect the local community as well as the full spectrum of homeland 
security partners who have a role to play in the protection, prevention, response and 
recovery of terrorist attacks on our highways and highway critical infrastructure.   
The United States is blessed with freedoms unmatched anywhere else on earth.  
Nevertheless, freedom is not without its tradeoffs.  The openness of our country means 
we have purposely and knowingly sacrificed some of our security.  Benjamin Franklin 
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said, “Those who desire to give up freedom in order to gain security will not have, nor do 
they deserve, either one.”  This is especially true of our highways.  Citizens, illegal 
aliens, bank robbers, murderers, thieves and even terrorists drive America’s roadways, 
generally unencumbered in their pursuits.  Unfortunately, the openness of our highways 
lends itself to vulnerability in the form of terrorist attacks on the highways and critical 
highway infrastructure.  Highway security strategies need to evolve and reflect the 
complex environment that has been presented.  Strategies must incorporate a more 
realistic assessment of who the transportation stakeholders actually are.  In lieu of 
defining transportation stakeholders as simply state and local transportation agencies and 
private transportation asset owners, the definition of stakeholders must incorporate a 
much broader demographic to include first responders, the intelligence community, the 
law enforcement community and the local community served by the transportation assets.  
Terrorism prevention strategies at the federal, state and local level must include elements 
of each level of government.   
Managing homeland security risk as a complex, adaptive system requires the 
ability to change and adapt quickly.  Unfortunately, our federal, state and local 
governments are plagued bureaucracies unable to evolve and respond quickly in the face 
of change.  As homeland security leaders and government officials, we need to remember 
Bak’s discovery and develop highway security strategies incorporating the complexities 
interwoven in our nation. 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Prior to 9/11, for the most part, terrorism was something that happened “over 
there.”  Although the United States had isolated incidents of domestic terrorism, 
international terrorism was a tactic we heard and read about occurring in some foreign 
county.  Our harsh awakening to this seemingly new threat resulted in the concept of 
homeland security. We, as a nation, struggle to determine what homeland security means, 
as the construct itself is constantly evolving as organizational forces, politics, budgets and 
changing threats are only some of the myriad of factors shaping its definition.  Like the 
sphinx rising from the ashes, homeland security is a strange mixture of creatures melded 
together into a stronger, more resilient being.  Bellavita observes this genesis; writing in 
Homeland Security Affairs, he exposed seven different definitions of homeland security, 
concluding, “Homeland security is a continuously evolving social construction, a reality 
shaped by social processes” (Bellavita, 2008, p. 21).  Although homeland security is a 
new concept, we can see Bellavita’s point as we considered the evolution of the term 
from a means of preventing terrorism to response and recovery from natural disasters.  
The definition and application of homeland security is in the eye of the beholder, often 
conceived and applied in terms of roles and responsibilities.  Thus, homeland security is 
far different for FEMA than it is for the FBI. 
The Quadrennial Homeland Security Review states,  
Homeland security is a concerted national effort to ensure a homeland that 
is safe, secure, and resilient against terrorism and other hazards where 
American interests, aspirations, and way of life can thrive. (DHS, 2010, p. 
13)  
No other organization has a larger role in ensuring a safe homeland against terrorism than 
law enforcement organizations.  Terrorism, at its most basic level, is a violation of law.  
The military, although proficient at providing expertise and support, is constrained by the 
limits imposed by posse comitatus.  The Quadrennial Homeland Security Review 
considers homeland security an enterprise, defining this enterprise as,  
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The collective efforts and shared responsibilities of Federal, State, local, 
tribal, territorial, nongovernmental, and private-sector partners—as well as 
individuals, families, and communities—to maintain critical homeland 
security capabilities.  It connotes a broad-based community with a 
common interest in the public safety [emphasis added] and well-being of 
America and American society and is composed of multiple partners and 
stakeholders whose roles and responsibilities are distributed and shared. 
(DHS, 2010, p. 12)    
Law enforcement, with its central focus on protection of human life and property, 
is one of many public safety organizations within this homeland security enterprise; 
however, law enforcement has an additional responsibility not shared with most other 
public safety organizations.  Law enforcement agencies have the added authority of 
enforcing the law and apprehending criminals.  Within this homeland security enterprise, 
law enforcement agencies are the sole organization with the ability to prevent a terrorist 
attack through investigation and arrest.  Thus, law enforcement’s role is unique, 
tremendous and vital to the success of maintaining a secure homeland.  
Globalization has entrenched terrorism, at least for the foreseeable future.  
Terrorist organizations will change, tactics will evolve, but terrorism will remain a threat 
to our way of life well into the future.  Like drugs, gangs and Internet scams, terrorism is 
crime—to be dealt with by the police.  However, many law enforcement agencies have 
not recognized their pivotal and incredibly important role in this fight against terrorism 
and, therefore, have not embraced this new role. Terrorism is not a big city problem.  Just 
as drugs and gangs started within large cities and spread to smaller communities, so will 
terrorism.  Ignoring the threat forces us to repeat history and places us in the September 
10, 2001, mindset, lacking the imagination for the unimaginable.   Law enforcement 
officers are the foot soldiers of this war on terror in the United States.  It is a very small 
army with a tremendous responsibility.  Our public looks to the police to protect them 
against crime and criminals; terrorists are the new criminals and terrorism is the new 
crime.   
The strategies and tactics to make the public safe against terrorism are similar to, 
and a natural extension of, existing law enforcement strategies.    Embracing the concept 
of maintaining public safety against acts of terrorism should not be a difficult process if 
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one remembers that terrorism is a crime.  No paradigm shift is necessary.  Police are 
trained from a very early stage in how to identify the signs that criminal activity is afoot.  
Terrorism is not unlike other more traditional crimes, like burglary and murder.  The 
signs of terrorism are identifiable.  Expanding the police officer’s repertoire to include 
the ability to identify these signs is just an extension of the officer’s skill set.     
A. TRAINING LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL 
In cities and areas affected by previous terrorism attacks, law enforcement 
organizations have excelled in their anti-terrorism and terrorism-preparedness roles.  New 
York City and the National Capital Region’s law enforcement agencies are forever 
changed by the events of 9/11.  An outpouring of homeland security funding has 
enhanced the capabilities of the affected organizations.   
Highway safety is a natural role for law enforcement organizations.  Traffic 
enforcement is a fundamental function and a public expectation.  The basics of 
enforcement are taught at the academy, with emphasis on looking beyond the initial 
violation for signs of impaired driving, drug trafficking and crimes in progress.  Despite 
the fact that terrorism will remain a pervasive threat to our nation, the signs of terrorist 
activity are often not taught in police academies outside of agencies with prior terrorism 
histories or those with high-profile terrorists targets.   As so many of law enforcement’s 
encounters are with the general public, and often during the course of a traffic encounter, 
and nearly all terrorist will travel our highways en route to their target destination, 
academy basic training must teach officers how to identify potential terrorists activity in 
progress.   This training should start with the basics, such as understanding the threat and 
terrorist tactics.  Police officers just entering law enforcement may have been very young 
on 9/11, and may not have fully grasped the events leading up to the attack.  
Understanding this history will provide perspective.  Police officers may not realize their 
role in securing the homeland because no one has told them. 
No assumptions should be made about a police officer’s ability to recognize 
precursors of terrorism, such as the presence of chemicals, wires, tape, strange odors, 
weapons, ammunition and pipes in the vehicle.  Academies and police administrators 
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cannot make the assumption that police officers will recognize terrorism on their own 
without appropriate training.  Additionally, the public expects the police to be 
knowledgeable in terrorism tactics. 
Training has to be continuous and must be updated as terrorism tactics evolve.  
Training should recognize the difference between al Qaeda-inspired tactics and methods 
versus those of traditional domestic terrorists, since the precursors and behaviors of 
different terrorists groups may vary. 
Police officers need a basic understanding of the current threat, the potential 
targets in their communities, and any specific threats in the area.   Police also need to be 
empowered to share this information with stakeholders and even the community when 
appropriate and without compromising valuable intelligence.  As we engage the public in 
our efforts to prevent terrorism on our highways, police officers need to be taught how to 
facilitate this relationship.  Police officers have a role in teaching the public about 
terrorism, especially with regard to suspicious activity reporting.  Police officers have 
much interaction with the public; these interactions must be viewed as an opportunity to 
facilitate the public’s help in terrorism prevention.    
Police officers need training with regard to the investigation of suspicious activity 
reporting.  This involves enhanced interviewing techniques designed to extrapolate 
specific and detailed information uniquely identifying potential terrorist activity.  A 
proficient interview can prevent unnecessarily chasing erroneous leads, reduce the 
amount of costly time devoted to needless follow-up investigations and prevent 
allegations of police profiling.  Suspicious activity reports are anonymous; returning to 
the reporting person may be impossible. Therefore, police have one opportunity to 
conduct a thorough interview and obtain pertinent details that can be analyzed and 
evaluated to determine if further follow-up is necessary.  
Linking information together is critical.  Suspicious activity reports in and of 
themselves may seem innocuous.  However, linking reports together can reveal much 
greater detail and insight.  The inability to link critical pieces together, in part, led to the 
catastrophic events of 9/11.   
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The National Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative is designed to help 
create these vital links.  The National SAR Initiative recognizes the important role of 
police officers,  
In today’s policing, connecting the dots of suspicious activity before an 
incident occurs has become an integral and imperative job for America’s 
law enforcement, from the officer on the street to supporting analysts.  The 
NSI is designed to do just that, connect the dots. (2010)   
The National SAR Initiative is designed to be a partnership for sharing of information, 
and is accomplished in several ways: a simple phone call from the police agency to the 
FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force, pushing the information to the local fusion center, or 
even the option of submitting the information through eGuardian.  Ultimately, the 
information is available on a shared database. 
Police officers must understand the importance of sharing information, but also 
the importance of keeping abreast of information being shared.  The National SAR 
Initiative provides the mechanics as well as the platform for better information sharing in 
general and the sharing of SARs.   
Police training must go beyond the realm of preventive and investigative 
techniques.  Terrorist, especially the lone wolf, often stay below the radar and remain 
undetected despite our best efforts.  In the event of a terrorist attack on our highways or 
on highway infrastructure (or elsewhere), our police officers must know how to 
appropriately respond to the incident.  Responding to a terrorist attack is unlike most 
other police responses.  Terrorism adds new elements, such as secondary devices, 
multiple terrorists, multiple locations, and suicide terrorism.  Thus, police officers must 
know how to respond, and create concentric rings of defense as proposed by Hoffman et 
al.  Additionally, police officers must be trained in the investigation of a successful 
terrorist attack; recognizing such an attack will result in a multi-jurisdictional, multi-
discipline investigation involving all levels of government.   
Timothy McVeigh was stopped in rural Oklahoma, miles from his target location.  
He was stopped by an Oklahoma State Trooper who simply observed a minor traffic 
violation.  Every traffic stop is an opportunity for police to intervene on a crime, whether 
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the crime is drunk driving or terrorism.  Our police officers may be placed in the position 
of stopping a terrorist en route to his/her target destination while carrying or wearing an 
explosive device.   As suicide terrorism is a preferred method used by al Qaeda and 
expected to gain prominence, police officers must be appropriately trained in how to deal 
with this unique threat.  Imagine a police officer stopping a suicide terrorist along a busy 
highway.  This is the new reality and calls not just for a change in training, but also a 
change in the rules of engagement.  
B. ENGAGING THE PUBLIC 
In the years following 9/11 and the relative absence of a large-scale, mass-
casualty terrorist attack on our nation, garnering citizen involvement in terrorism 
prevention has become more challenging.  As a nation, our collective memory of the 
tragic events of September 11, 2001, has begun to fade, leaving terrorism in the 
background as other issues challenging our nation take precedent.   
The decline in the public’s perception of potential terrorist attacks in the United 
States is inconsistent with the reports and analyses of our government.  Our nation is still 
in harm’s way with regard to terrorism.    
Law enforcement represents a small portion of the American populous.  The 
relative small quantity of police personnel, the sheer size of the United States, and 
waning public involvement make the concept of preventing terrorism on our highways 
seem an impossible task.   Nevertheless, public complacency can be reversed if police 
organizations are willing to take the appropriate steps, especially with regard to 
preventing terrorism on our highways.   The average American drives 13,476 miles per 
year (Federal Highway Administration, 2011).  Each one of those drivers, as well as 
passengers and public transit users, can be another set of eyes in the prevention of 
terrorism on our highways.  The motoring public is a valuable and abundant asset the 
police cannot afford to ignore. 
Public engagement programs in the form of suspicious activity reporting offer 
promise as a means of preventing terrorism on our highways, but only if properly 
retooled.  The See Something, Say Something model created by the Metropolitan Transit 
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Authority offers a simple message that has been adopted by countless other organizations 
as a means of soliciting the help of the public.  The problem is the See Something, Say 
Something campaign offers no specifics with regard to what is considered suspicious or 
what the indicators of terrorists activity are.  Individual citizens are left to their own 
judgments to determine what is considered suspicious. 
In my experience, I have witnessed this countless times as citizens allow their 
imaginations to fill in details and make faulty assumptions.  The police are left spending 
countless hours tracking down the suspicious individual, only to learn the caller omitted 
pertinent details that would have explained the behavior or action.  Too often, suspicious 
activity calls are centered on people who are described as “Middle Eastern.” Therefore, 
any behavior, such as merely waiting for the next train, is instantly assumed suspicious.  
The resulting investigation often reveals nationalities are assumed, and more often than 
not the “suspicious” individual is actually Hispanic, Asian, or African American, and 
their behavior was innocuous.   Law enforcement personnel chase these worthless leads 
that often lead to hurt feelings.  Time is wasted and limited resources are strained. 
Just as police officers must be trained in terrorism, so must the public if we are to 
improve the quality of the information the public reports to the police.  Therefore, public 
engagement campaigns must be coupled with an educational component.  The public can 
be educated about the threat and what types of activities and behaviors are considered 
suspicious and worthy of police intervention, without compromising the integrity of 
intelligence data.  The public needs to understand behaviors and actions are suspicious; 
people, simply because of their assumed national origin, are not.  
The public will get involved if the police solicit their assistance and provide them 
with an education on terrorism. Additionally, through this education process, the public’s 
observation skills can be honed, reducing the frivolous and often annoying suspicious 
activity calls.  Educating the public can be achieved in a variety of ways. 
Community Oriented Policing offers a ready-made platform that can easily 
expanded to include precursors to terrorism, identifying individuals who are engaging in 
the steps towards radicalization, and identifying suspicious behaviors specifically 
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associated with certain businesses such as storage facilities, gun dealers and home 
improvement centers.  Citizen’s police academies offer similar opportunities to train the 
public in terrorism awareness.  Additionally, community oriented policing and citizen 
police academies offer law enforcement agencies the opportunity to showcase the 
expanding role of law enforcement in the realm of terrorism, while simultaneously 
engaging citizens in the war against terrorism in their own communities.   
The Coast Guard’s America’s Waterway Watch program has incorporated a public 
educational component worthy of further exploration by police agencies.  Most police 
agencies already have established websites.  Emulating the Coast Guard model, police 
agencies may consider incorporating public terrorism awareness training on their 
websites.  Short video clips produced in-house can offer an inexpensive method of public 
education about the highway terrorism threat as well as how to identify and report 
suspicious activity.  A more cost-effective method would be to incorporate links to lists 
of potential terrorism indicators/behaviors specific to the highway.  Police agencies can 
tailor the message to their specific vulnerabilities beyond highways and transportation 
assets.    
The pervasiveness of social media demands further exploration by law 
enforcement agencies as we seek new ways to engage the public in all types of crime 
prevention to include terrorism prevention.   Twitter, Facebook and YouTube offer 
inexpensive outlets for public education and are a great means of information exchange.   
Nearly 70 million people in the United States own smartphones (Comscore, Inc., 
2011).  With roughly a quarter of the population in possession of these devices and 
popularity still on the rise, police agencies must capitalize on the amenities the 
smartphones offer.  Organizations are creating their own downloadable applications, or 
apps, thereby giving the smartphone user instant access to a wide variety of information, 
while also providing for information exchange.  For example, Kentucky’s Office of 
Homeland Security released an app known as Eyes and Ears on Kentucky. It gives the 
user the ability to provide anonymous real-time suspicious activity reporting and the 
ability to attach pictures and utilize the phone’s global positioning system during the 
reporting process (Homeland Security Newswire, April 4, 2011).  Police agencies have 
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the ability to launch similar applications with specific emphasis on suspicious activity 
reporting of potential terrorist activity on the highway (or anywhere) within their 
community.   
Although technological innovations have expanded the horizons of information 
exchange and communication, more traditional methods are worthy of exploration.  
Traditional media sources offer methods for educating and engaging the community in 
terrorism prevention through suspicious activity reporting.  Hometown newspapers 
provide a more traditional platform for short educational articles.  Public service 
announcements on community access television channels and on local radio stations, 
especially if delivered by a member of the local police community, has the ability to 
reach diverse audiences.  The messages need to stress remaining vigilant, the current 
threat, what is suspicious, and exactly who to call in the event of witnessing suspicious 
activity. 
The important aspect to remember when creating public engagement campaigns is 
the need to ensure they do not target one specific demographic, organization or agency.  
The entire public needs to be brought to bear on our efforts to prevent terrorism on our 
highways and critical highway infrastructure.  To emphasize or omit one group limits the 
scope of the campaign and therefore limits the information gleaned.  In this pervasive 
fight against terrorism, everyone, in every community and beyond, is a stakeholder. 
C. ENGAGING OUR PARTNERS 
Law enforcement agencies have worked hard to build relationships with other 
agencies and non-governmental organizations.  Law enforcement agencies should 
capitalize on these pre-existing relationships as they seek to prevent terrorism on our 
highways (and elsewhere).  Social service workers, firefighters, utility workers, highway 
workers, medical caregivers and private businesses can be great observers and reporters.  
However, it is up to law enforcement to start the dialogue and educate their public service 
partners about the signs of potential terrorism. 
With regard to preventing terrorism on our highways, state and local departments 
of transportation, utility workers, toll collectors, and highway maintenance contractors 
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are particularly good observers because of their familiarity with the area and ability to 
readily identify when something looks out of place.  Toll collectors have the ability to 
observe the demeanor of the driver and the contents of the vehicle.   
According to the Transportation Security Administration, the responsibility of 
terrorism prevention and response on our highways is in the hands of the state and local 
transportation departments who own the roads and the roadway infrastructure.  Highways 
are considered critical, but not enough to merit a cohesive, well-funded, uniform 
prevention program.  Local and state transportation agencies may not understand the 
threat or their role in preventing an act of terrorism on our roadways.  Police executives 
not only have a responsibility to educate their police officers and the general public, but 
also to educate their state and local transportation agencies.  Local and state 
transportation officials also need to work with the police, as their roles go well beyond 
prevention, extending into response and recovery in the event of a successful terrorist 
attack on our highways.  The issue of resolving how transportation workers will work as 
first responders must be resolved at the local community level and well in advance of an 
attack. 
As fellow first responders, transportation workers, firefighters and EMS must also 
be educated by the police on terrorism tactics.  Firefighters and EMS workers in 
particular are susceptible to secondary attacks as they unwittingly rush into an injured 
crowd after an IED attack.  The police, as the subject matter experts in explosives and 
terrorism tactics, must be the educators for all homeland security partners engaged in this 
type of response.   
The benefit of engaging our partners is their ability to spread the word beyond our 
partner agencies.  Law enforcement should ask their partners to look for ways to prevent 
terrorism and report suspicious activity. 
D. STRATEGY 
Strategy designed to prevent an attack on our highways and highway critical 
infrastructure often does not include the police.  Police must intervene and help facilitate 
the development of local and state strategies that accurately reflect the complex 
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environment that has developed in the years following 9/11.  Highway security strategy 
must incorporate all the organizations and agencies that have a role in prevention, 
response and recovery—not just transportation agencies and the local police.  Roles must 
be established in advance, with a clear understanding of the limitations and expectations 
of those within the partnership.  Although the highways and highway infrastructure are 
owned by the state and local governments, any large-scale event will entail a 
multidiscipline response from all levels of government.  Abilities, resources, 
responsibilities and roles must be established in advance of an event to prevent the 
overlapping of responsibilities and duplication of effort.   
E. PRACTICE MAKES PERFECT 
After developing strategies for the prevention of and response to terrorism on our 
highways and highway infrastructure, it is critical to test these strategies to determine 
whether they meet the needs of the community.  Exercising strategies allows weaknesses 
to be identified, clarifies roles and responsibilities, and allows the strategy makers to 
adjust the strategy as weaknesses are observed.  Exercises must include all the 
stakeholders and must be reflective of the complexities that naturally exist in the 
community. 
F. HIGHWAY CONTINGENCY PLANNING  
The cascading effect of an attack on our highways or on other critical 
infrastructures is a testament to the vulnerability to this very open system.  Local and 
state strategies must consider the effects of the loss of a bridge or roadway to a terrorist 
attack and the effects on the local community, region, state and nation.  Local and state 
highway security strategies must have contingency plans for rerouting traffic and 
providing goods and services to an isolated community.  By discussing the “what ifs” in 
advance, and creating viable options to the worst-case scenario involving the loss of 
critical highway infrastructure, the local community has an alternative plan available for 
just such a disaster. 
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G. CONCLUSION  
The strategies proposed can and do work.  The attempted detonation of a vehicle-
laden IED in Times Square on May 1, 2010, illustrates these strategies in action.  The 
initial report of the suspicious vehicle was a direct result of employing the assistance of 
the public through the See Something, Say Something public engagement suspicious 
activity reporting campaign.   Although it appeared to be a smoldering vehicle, the well-
educated, well-trained fire department quickly realized this situation was far more than 
the run-of-the-mill car fire.  The collaborative effort between the police department, fire 
department and public works department was integral to maintaining order and defusing 
the situation expeditiously, but with attention to detail necessary in a criminal 
investigation.  The success of the Times Square attempted bombing incident is a direct 
result of training law enforcement personnel, engaging the public and engaging our 
partners.  This success can be shared if strategies such as these are put in place in advance 
of a terrorist incident, such as an IED on our roadways.   
The National Strategy for Counterterrorism states,  
The United States deliberately uses the word “war” to describe our 
relentless campaign against al-Qa’ida.  However, this Administration has 
made it clear that we are not at war with the tactic of terrorism or the 
religion of Islam.  We are at war with a specific organization—al-Qa’ida. 
(The White House, 2011, p. 2)   
Moghadam argues globalization will spawn the rise of terrorism.  In the United States, 
law enforcement officers are the warriors in this war, whether it is against al Qaeda or 
any other terrorist group operating in the United States.  This is a tremendous 
responsibility thrust upon law enforcement and one that has yet to be fully embraced by 
law enforcement agencies.  No other organization within the homeland security enterprise 
has the power to investigate and arrest.  Terrorism, at its most basic level, is a crime and 
should therefore be a natural extension to law enforcement’s traditional duties.     
The police are far too small a force to fight this war alone.  The public must be 
engaged in the process, but before doing so, the police must fully understand the threat 
and their newly expanded role.  Highway safety is a law enforcement niche, but terrorism 
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threats to United States highways and highway critical infrastructure have unwittingly 
placed American police in new role, well beyond the confines of highway safety.  Our 
police must now fill the void created by the threat of terrorism on our highways by 
embracing an expanded role of highway security.   
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